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Introduction 
The goal of this thesis is to analyze and interpret Heidegger’s theory of ecstatic 
temporality found in the second division of Being and Time, primarily in just one section, §65. 
Although readers will have progressed through more than three-quarters of the entire work 
before §65 is reached, this section, entitled “Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care,” is 
key to the entire work. Heidegger’s many projects contained within Being and Time—such as the 
project of Destruktion and the project of fundamental ontology—are all justified through the 
theory of ecstatic temporality. Despite the section’s fundamental importance within Being and 
Time, however, Heidegger is at his least loquacious and the section suffers greatly from a severe 
lack of philosophical argumentation. The section all too often lays out assertions without 
justification and proceeds with haste. According to David Farrell Krell’s count, there are four 
main “theses” supporting the theory of ecstatic temporality contained within roughly six pages. 
The brevity of §65 is even more alarming given the fact that Heidegger intends for his theory of 
temporality to be the first theory of time to have broken out of the paradigm set by Aristotle’s 
analysis of time set forth in his Physics. While the first division of Being and Time serves as a 
propaedeutic for what is to come in §65, it is no doubt that there is much work to be done in 
working out the key elements of the theory of ecstatic temporality. My research will not be 
limited to Being and Time, but will also include Heidegger’s short 1925 essay “The Concept of 
Time,” and two longer works The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic and Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology—all of which appeared in the 1920s as part of Heidegger’s project of 
fundamental ontology. 
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The first chapter of this paper will provide an exegesis of ecstatic temporality. In order to 
do so, I will first ground §65 in Heidegger’s theory of care (Sorge). While the structure of care is 
undeniably critical to the ontology of Being and Time, I argue that Heidegger’s intention in 
Division One is to brush away much of the “philosophical clutter” that has impeded a true 
fundamental ontology. By that I mean Heidegger intends to ground his ontology not on a theory 
of consciousness or the soul or knowledge or synthetic a priori judgments. Rather, Heidegger is 
attempting to clear a space, a Spielraum, that allows for but does not begin with these things. 
Rather, Being and Time’s ontological topography is an exploration of the cleared playspace of 
existence, which allows Dasein to explore its possibilities. But the word “possibilities” must also 
be explored. What does it mean for possibilities to expose themselves meaningfully as 
possibilities to Dasein? Division One answers that the structure of care illuminates Dasein’s 
possibilities (which are always possibilities-for-Being [Seinkönnen]) because Dasein is always 
already thrown into a world that has a nexus of meaning built into it, alongside which Dasein 
presently exists, and that Dasein can understand its projects and possibilities which are always 
for the sake of something. Division Two redevelops each of Division I’s themes as based in 
Dasein’s relation to its own temporality (Zeitlichkeit). The world exists as an integral part of 
Dasein’s past, Dasein exists alongside other beings in the present, and Daseins’ projects and 
possibilities are all fundamentally futural.  
Heidegger calls each one of these forms of time an ecstasis (Ekstase) of temporality, and 
the unity of the three ecstases of temporality is care. Such a unity brings together all three 
ecstases, but is not in any way ontologically reducible to the so-called “present moment.” Rather, 
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“in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole” (BT 401). Each ecstasis is whole 
and complete, contrary to the Aristotelian analysis of time, which reduces the past and future to 
unanalyzable non-Being. Likewise, ecstatic temporality cuts directly at many of the fundamental 
tenets of the ordinary conception of time that philosophy has subscribed to since Aristotle. In 
order to make those differences explicit, I rely on the four theses that Krell has distilled from 
§65’s discussion of ecstatic temporality. They are, in order: “Time is originally the 
temporalization of temporality, which makes possible the constitution of the structure of care”; 
“temporality is essentially ecstatic”; “temporality temporalizes originally out of the future”; and 
“original time is finite” (EC 21). The third section of the first chapter engages each of these 
theses directly. But what should be clear from the theses, even before analyzing them, is that 
they are aimed to usurp the 2,500-year hegemony of the "now" in terms of thinking both time 
and being.  
The last section of the first chapter will focus on exploring a difficulty that arises between 
the publication of Being and Time (1927) and Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1928). In the 
year between the publication of the two works, it appears that Heidegger altogether abandons the 
third thesis, which states that temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future in 
order to rework the important of the ecstasis of the present. But significant issues arise out of 
Heidegger’s decision to drop this thesis, specifically because the third and fourth theses are 
closely related to one another: part of the justification of the fourth thesis (that original time is 
finite) relies on the fact that finitude and closing-off belongs to the structure of the futural 
ecstasis. But if Heidegger is to turn away from the third thesis, the fourth thesis is jeopardized 
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despite the fact that Heidegger argues for it (although, as we shall see, only to a point) in Basic 
Problems.   
Chapter Two of this paper will center around Derrida’s early (1964-5) reading of 
Division Two of Being and Time. As I wrote above, I argue in Chapter One that ecstatic 
temporality allowed Heidegger to explain the structure of Sorge and how Dasein meaningfully 
engages in the world. Likewise, ecstatic temporality represents a major step beyond Aristotelian 
ontology by breaking through the limitations of the present moment. I argue, however, that the 
impact of ecstatic temporality in the history of philosophy is much more important than that. By 
breaking free of the boundary set by the ‘now,’ Heidegger also takes a step beyond (or perhaps 
within) a metaphysical tradition which can only think in terms of the presence of what is present 
in the present. (Such a metaphysics also incorporates the modalities of presence [namely, 
absence] and thus incorporates what is known as “negative theology” in its purview as well.) The 
second division of Being and Time drives a divide directly into the history of philosophy by 
challenging the presupposition that an understanding of temporality is grounded in a sound 
metaphysics. Rather, Being and Time is committed to the opposite: grounding ontology in 
temporality. How does this play out? 
Being and Time is clear from the outset that it is in the pursuit of concrete questions. One 
of those concrete questions is “what is the meaning of finitude?” Dasein dies. It also has a 
relationship to that death. Two issues arise here, both related to the metaphysics of presence. 
Firstly, what is death in the Aristotelian or what Heidegger dubs the “‘vulgar” understanding of 
time? Nothing other than a point in the future, beyond which Dasein is no longer considered to 
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be living. This answer undoubtedly belies the importance of death; certainly one does not feel 
that one’s death is reducible to a mere point in time. But this reduction is precisely what is 
distilled from the account of time in Aristotle’s Physics, which attempts to give an account for 
bodies and motion, not the meaning of death. Secondly, if Dasein can only have a relationship 
with things given to it in the present (as the past and present are, in distinction to the now, not), 
how can Dasein have a relationship to its own death since it can never be present to such death in 
the present moment?  
I argue in the second chapter of this thesis that such questions that Heidegger is 
attempting to undertake in the 1920s cannot be answered in an ontological way so long as 
philosophy unknowingly grounds its metaphysics in an understanding of time that makes no 
ontological claim on the past or future. But, for example, death is unsurpassable, unüberholbar, 
according to Heidegger. Dasein dies, yes, but death is philosophically unsurpassable. I mean that 
in the sense that Being and Time realizes that an inquiry into the nature of Dasein’s undeniable 
finitude has the potential to solicit (which Derrida interprets as “to shake” from the Latin 
sollicitare) the entire structure of philosophy. As I argue in the second chapter, Heidegger’s 
investigation into Dasein’s finitude does not amount to an obsession with death but rather a deep 
engagement with the structures of all three ecstases: the past, future, and the present. By taking 
these ecstases seriously ontologically, Heidegger attempts to ground what we have always 
already been certain of: these ecstases of time assert themselves on us and the relationships that 
we have to them are not arbitrary. (What could be more meaningful than the matters of birth and 
death? These are precisely the matters by which we gauge the importance of any other matter.) 
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But, if Heidegger’s analyses are true, philosophy is not able to secure or justify these 
relationships within the confines of an understanding of time that has not been radically altered 
in the last two-and-a-half millennia. 
However, the question remains as to whether or not Heidegger is indeed able to break 
through the metaphysics of presence to do so. The last section of Chapter Two will engage with 
this question and explore Derrida’s answer to it. Does Heidegger exit or fully deconstruct the 
western philosophical canon? The answer would surely be “no” if that was actually the question. 
The retrospective question asked about the success of Being and Time to break out of the 
limitations of the metaphysics of presence should not be framed as if Heidegger threw out the 
philosophical rule book. Rather, one should question not whether Heidegger was able to think 
past the metaphysics of presence, but if Being and Time was able to think through it. Thinking 
past or without the metaphysics of presence means practicing philosophy ahistorically, which 
would be contradictory to the project of Being and Time in the first place. I argue that Heidegger 
does not seek to refute the metaphysics of presence but rather to shake (or “solicit”) the 
foundations of philosophy so that it may begin to take the first steps outside (or within, as 
Derrida argues) of the confines of ancient metaphysics.  
In order to arrive at such a conclusion, I have arranged the thesis to be comprised of two 
complementary chapters. The reader should view the first chapter as an exegesis of the 
fundamental aspects of ecstatic temporality as it appears in a selection of Heidegger’s works of 
the 1920s and a laying out of some of the fundamental philosophical moves and gestures in this 
period. Although a discussion of the problems surrounding ecstatic temporality as it appears in 
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Being and Time alone could warrant an entire thesis (at least), my ultimate goal is not to give an 
exhaustive analysis of Heidegger’s theory, but to examine the significance of such a theory. 
Thus, the first chapter serves to elucidate the theory of ecstatic temporality in order to ground the 
discussion of Heidegger’s Destruktion of the metaphysics of presence in the second chapter. I 
follow an early Derridean reading of this Destruktion and focus primarily on Derrida’s 1964-65 
lectures to tie up many of the threads that I begin in the first chapter. In conclusion, the reader 
should view this thesis as an attempt to ground properly the act of Destruktion in ecstatic 
temporality. As such, what is required to carry out this task is not only ananalysis of the theory of 
ecstatic temporality, but also an examination of why the problem of temporality is fundamental 
to metaphysics. To do so, I will look at some of the theoretical issues that Aristotelian 
temporality creates (such as an insufficient understanding of finitude) as well as some of the 
figures that attempted themselves to critique (implicitly or explicitly) the metaphysics of 
presence, such as Hume and Husserl. The latter failed to do so successfully because they were 
not able to think outside of the metaphysics that arose out of Aristotle’s conception of time. 
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Chapter One: 
Ecstatic Temporality in the Early Heidegger 
 
I. Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter will be to elucidate some of the major aspects of the structure 
of ecstatic temporality as it appears in Martin Heidegger’s writings in the 1920s. This essay will 
deal primarily with two issues in the study of ecstatic temporality, which is how Heidegger’s 
thinking of time figures into the existential analytic of Division One of Being and Time, and 
what the most fundamental theses of ecstatic temporality are. With regards to the first issue, I 
argue, with Alexander Chernyakov and James Luchte, that temporality grounds Heidegger’s 
project of fundamental ontology through a rethinking of the topos of existence. Such a topos of 
existence is elaborated through the structure of care (Sorge), whose “spatial” dimensions 
(thrownness, being-alongside, for-the-sake-of-which) are actually grounded in the ecstases of 
temporality. With regard to the second issue, I base my exegesis on David Krell’s “four theses” 
as given in his works Intimations of Mortality (1986) and Ecstasy, Catastrophe (2015). After an 
analysis of Krell’s four theses, I will also discuss issues that arose due to Heidegger’s own 
revision of the third and fourth theses in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, which potentially 
undermines the relationship between temporality’s primordial futurity and finitude that 
Heidegger had insisted upon in Being and Time. 
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II. Time in Aristotle’s Physics and “Vulgar” Time 
Heidegger’s confrontation with vulgar time arises out of Aristotle’s conception of time in 
Physics IV, which is summarized in section 219b and states that “time is just this—number of 
motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’” (P 70). (Heidegger will translate this passage as “this is 
time: that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the 
earlier and later” (BT 473)—I will come back to this translation later.) Such a ‘number’ entails a 
measuring or a counting which is predicated on the passage from the future into the present, and 
then a passage again into the past. According to Aristotle, then, the primacy of the now is 
necessary for an understanding of time itself as present, since it is “the "now" determines time, in 
so far as time involves the before and after” (P 219b12). Of course, the importance of the now is 
greater than how it can serve as a unit of measurement. The now not only measures time but is 
indicative of the passage of time as both a link and a boundary: “the "now" is the link of time, as 
has been said (for it connects past and future time), and it is a limit of time (for it is the beginning 
of the one and the end of the other)” (P 222a10-12).  
 Within this problematic of time, Aristotle also runs up against an ontological problem. 
How are we to think of the being of the now if the presence of the now is seemingly destroyed at 
every possible juncture if time is to truly be a passage? Aristotle himself notes that given the 
constant division happening within the now, it is likely that one may think that time “either does 
not exist at all or barely, and in the obscure way” (P 218a1). Derrida summarizes the problem of 
the divisibility of the now: “Time is divisible into parts, and yet none of its parts, no now, is in 
the present” (“OG” 40). The ontological problem here is the question of “how is it to be thought 
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that time is what is not?” (“OG” 39) Aristotle answers the problem by “giving into the obvious, 
that time is, that time has as its essence the nun.” Still, the essence of the nun must be worked out 
ontologically. Derrida, again: 
The nun  [now], the element of time, in this sense is not in itself temporal. It is 
temporal only in becoming temporal, that is, in ceasing to be, in passing over to 
no-thingness in the form of being-past or being-future. Even if it is envisaged as 
(past or future) nonbeing, the now is determined as the intemporal kernel of time, 
the nonmodifiable nucleus of temporal modification, the inalterable form of 
temporalization. Time is what overtakes this nucleus, in affecting it with nothing. 
But in order to be, in order to be a being, it must not be affected by time, it must 
not become (past or future). To participate in beingness, in ousia [beingness or 
substantiality], therefore is to participate in being-present, in the presence of the 
present, or, if you will, in presentness (“OG” 40). 
I will return to the question of affection later in Chapter 2, but for now we have the necessary 
ontological and temporal framework to set up Heidegger’s problematic in Being and Time. 
Through Aristotle’s conception of time, we not only have a groundwork for the fundamental 
concepts of the ordinary concept of time (the now, the boundary, the point, the now as tode ti—
concepts that Heidegger is only repeated throughout the tradition up to Hegel’s philosophy of 
time) that are simultaneously linked to a conception of being as ousia as the presence of the 
present. 
 With the Aristotelian conception of time discussed, we may now move onto the first 
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division of Being and Time, which takes implicit aim at the kind of metaphysics that arises out of 
Aristotelian temporality. In order to break out of a thought of being as the mere presence of the 
present, the first division centers around Heidegger’s concept of “care” (Sorge), which, as we 
will see, creates a kind of ontological “playspace” by focusing on the temporal structure of 
Dasein’s possibilities.  
 
III.       Ontological Topography 
 Before reaching into the ontological or structural components of Heidegger’s theory of 
temporality as it appears in the 1920s, I believe it is important to begin by asking how such a 
theory fits into Heidegger’s early philosophy in general, and why it is a necessary undertaking at 
all. The short answer is championed by James Luchte and Alexander Chernyakov in a single 
word: topos. Being and Time is devoted to not only a terminological but an ontological re-
examination of human being, beginning with Heidegger’s insistence on using the traditional 
German word for existence, Dasein, to designate the Being of the being at stake in Being and 
Time’s ontological examination. Rendered with a hyphen, any examination of Da-sein demands 
research not only into the being of this being, but also its Da, its there and hence its very 
thrownness into a given topos or place. In attempting to get behind traditionally loaded 
conceptions of human being—such as consciousness, the soul, élan vital—Being and Time is 
inaugurated by an ontological research into the structure of Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-
sein) which placed Dasein in context of care and concern in which one, first and foremost, and in 
a pre-theoretical way, finds oneself always already engaged in a meaningful world. Luchte warns 
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readers off of a particular reading of being-in-the-world when he writes that,  
we must not imagine moreover that this being-in-the-world is an object for an inspection, 
or a thing ready to hand for practical deployment and utilization. On the contrary, 
Heidegger’s phenomenological destructuring of theoretical and practical is an attempt to 
retrieve the being of Dasein upon the original topos of ecstatic temporality. (HEP, 12). 
But what does this topos mean in philosophical or ontological terms? Luchte answers that 
the primordial topos is neither theoretical nor practical, but is a disclosure of an original 
phenomenon. Such an interpretation of truth implies a re-appropriation by Heidegger of 
the ‘Greek’ sense of phenomenology as letting the phenomenon ‘be seen from itself’ … 
Beyond, or beneath questions of ‘pure consciousness’ and of the possibility of a priori 
synthetic judgments [as in Kant], there is already a prerequisite self-disclosure of beings, 
an unexpected detour to the ‘“place” of an object. (HEP, 13) 
What Heidegger is after in crafting Dasein’s Da, then, is an ontological opening that allows for 
the very possibility of possibilities themselves, which occur in the light of Being. In Heidegger’s 
own words, “Dasein takes space in … In existing, it has already made room for its own leeway. 
It determines its own location in such a manner that it comes back from the space it has made 
room for to the ‘place’ which it has reserved” (BT 419). The German for the second sentence in 
the quotation reads “Existierend has es sich je schon einen Speilraum eingeräumt” (SZ 368). 
Macquarrie & Robinson have rendered Spielraum as “leeway,” which does indeed translate into 
leeway in a more sober sense, but a look at the German here is necessary to craft a better analogy 
for what Heidegger is aiming for in creating Dasein’s topos, which, if one chooses to render 
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Spielraum literally, would be a playspace. Here it would be wise to call upon Heraclitus’s fifty-
second fragment, wherein he writes that “Time is a child playing a game of draughts.” I would 
argue that Heidegger takes Heraclitus at his word here in the linkage of time and playing, 
Spielen. As Luchte writes above, while Kant may have paved the way to such an ontological 
Spielraum by examining the structure of knowledge before its contents, Heidegger’s intention in 
Being and Time is to get beneath any questions of epistemology or theoretical content in order to 
examine how it is that such epistemological content—or any content, for that matter—could be 
revealed in the first place. If any investigation is to be truly ontological, it must begin not with 
the givenness of the mind or with thought but with the condition of givenness as such. Thus, to 
engage Dasein in its playspace, Heidegger begins his investigation with the pre-theoretical in 
Being-in-the-world, which “means nothing but a unity of a special topos in the variety of 
references or assignments, within the contexture of involvement” (OT 183).  
Part and parcel with such Being-in-the-world of course is the structure of care (Sorge), in 
which Dasein is always already meaningfully engaged and taken up by the beings around it. That 
Heidegger structures the first division of Being and Time around care is philosophically 
important for several reasons, including the inversion of philosophy’s traditional privileging of 
theory over praxis, but for our purposes here it is constitutive of Dasein’s Da as a pre-theoretical 
starting point that assumes that meaning is always already (immer schon) given to Dasein 
without needing logical constructions to do so. But how is such meaning and understanding 
given? For such a topos to be meaningful, Heidegger stresses in Being and Time that we must 
examine “what makes possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of care, in the unity 
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of its articulation as we have unfolded it” (BT 371, his emphasis). In other words, we must look 
at not just how Dasein interacts with hammers and dogs, but we must inquire into the conditions 
for the possibility of Dasein’s Da in the first place as a structural totality. Heidegger’s answer to 
this question is as such: “If we say that entities ‘have meaning’, this signifies that they have 
become accessible in their Being; and this Being, as projected upon its ‘upon-which’ [das 
Woraufhin], is what ‘really’ ‘has meaning’ first of all.” (BT 371-372). Meaning is thus 
understood here as the upon-which the projection of an understanding of being is projected onto, 
and the “question about the meaning of the Being of an entity takes as its theme the ‘upon-
which’ of that understanding of Being which underlies all Being of entities” (BT 372). In other 
words, meaning has the structure of an understanding of Being, upon which Dasein projects. 
Dasein projects an understanding onto a hammer, which it knows as the kind of being that is 
readily available for use towards construction projects, and Dasein (implicitly or explicitly) 
understands itself in that it has become accessible in its own being as something that can do such 
projecting. But we should not read this thinking of topos without its temporalization, as 
Heidegger makes clear throughout Being and Time’s second division. 
Heidegger writes, however, that Dasein has its own role to play in creating such a unity 
of meaning through care, which is through anticipatory resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), which 
forces Dasein right up against the question of the meaning of Being as it is given through one’s 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being (Seinkönnen). By working through such a meaning of Being in 
the structure of care, what Heidegger is seeking to expose is a fundamental thesis about 
temporality, which is that it is time that is the condition for the possibility of such a topological 
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understanding of Being. However, to excavate such a structure of meaning, Heidegger 
undertakes a radical revision in the history of philosophy by upending theories of temporality 
that have drawn from the Aristotelian tradition of giving complete supremacy to the “now” of 
time whilst remaining indifferent to the ontological meaning of the past that preceded it and the 
future that is yet to come. With such an understanding, one may remark that it is as if time 
stretches out its arms into the non-Being of the past and the future. Does this not indicate that the 
past and future have little bearing on my understanding of Being, and that what is meaningful is 
only given to me inside of the present moment? If the past and future are ontologically not (the 
past is gone; the future is not yet), then how could they affect one’s understanding of one’s own 
life and possibilities?  
Heidegger’s response to these considerations (which all branch out from the millennia-
long privileging of the “now”) is that such an understanding of Being is not possible so long as 
we do not specifically take in all three ecstases of time (past, present, and future) into the account 
of Dasein as a temporal being. In short, beings, situations, and so on are only meaningful to 
Dasein because Dasein has a relationship with these things inside of a structure of temporality 
that cannot be contained to the present. In terms of topology, it is only a temporality that includes 
the past, present, and future that can constitute the disclosedness of Dasein’s Da. What does 
Heidegger mean by this? Part of what is coming under fire in Being and Time is a philosophical 
viewpoint that takes existence to happen exclusively in the present moment. In the ordinary or 
vulgar understanding of time, my engagements with the beings arounds me happens in real time, 
which is to say that it happens now. One does not engage, according to the vulgar understanding 
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of time, with my world in the past and in the future; how could one act in anything but the 
present? Heidegger’s answer to this is that the very possibility of meaningful action and 
activity—and meaning itself—is only possible if one has an ecstatic relation to the past, present, 
and future.  
Undergirding such a relation is Dasein’s relationship to its own death, which is 
unsurpassable (unüberholbar). As unsurpassable and not just one of many potentialities to 
choose from, death is what breathes urgency into Dasein’s self-understanding, since it is this 
death that forces Dasein to spring to action to act inside of a coming-to-terms with finitude: an 
eternal life would be one without meaning. Heidegger begins to breaks down the temporal 
structure of Dasein’s ability to be towards its potentiality-for-Being:  
This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, come towards itself 
in its ownmost possibility, and that it can put up with this possibility as a 
possibility in thus letting itself come towards itself—in other words, that it exists. 
This letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts 
up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards. If either 
authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death [Sein zum Tode] belongs to 
Dasein’s Being, then such Being-towards-death is possible only as something 
futural … By the term ‘futural’ we do not here have in view a “now” which has 
not yet become ‘actual’ and which sometime will be for the first time. We have in 
view the coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-being, come 
towards itself. Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way 
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that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as it is futural in its Being in 
general” (BT 372-73) 
Part and parcel of the excavation of the meaning of death in Being and Time, Dasein’s Being-
towards-death now becomes a central fixture of the explication of the unity of care as ecstatic 
temporality.  
What I mean is that Heidegger argues that we must look to the phenomenon of death to 
guide the investigation of meaning: it is because my life is finite that my choices become 
meaningful so long as I am authentically given over to the fact that my life will end. In contrast 
to inauthentic Dasein, authentic Dasein looks (even if implicitly) towards death in the 
understanding that life is finite and that it does not have infinite time work out its potentiality-
for-Being and must do so with an understanding of death at the fore. Likewise, this relationship 
to death and the future is not the anticipation of a “now” that will arrive at some point in the 
future (which may certainly be a correct statement about death), but the relationship can be 
characterized as truly being ecstatic in the sense of a stepping-outside-oneself and then coming-
towards-itself. What this means is that Dasein projects its possibilities upon such an 
understanding that is primarily futural, and this structure of meaning returns back to Dasein and 
its understanding. As ecstatic, however, this does not mean that Dasein is something primarily 
static or stationary whose understanding begins from a locus of what is present in the present and 
only goes out to the future in order to circle back to this “home base.” Rather, Dasein, “as being, 
is always coming towards itself—that is to say, in so far as it is futural in its Being in general” 
(BT 373). As Dasein steps outside and ahead of itself, it always returns back with an 
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understanding that futural possibilities must always be grounded through the nullity that is death, 
and such a nullity is what Dasein returns back to itself with. Dasein’s circuitous stepping-outside 
and coming-towards does not mean that Dasein first exists in the present moment and then heads 
into the future and comes back; if this were the case, Dasein would be static and not ecstatic. 
 Likewise, Dasein has a similar relation to the past. The German word that Heidegger uses 
is Gewesenheit, which is based off of the past perfect participle that translates into English as 
“have been.” Heidegger uses this term in the early works to distance himself from the 
understanding of the past as Vergangenheit, the typical German expression for the past but which 
here would indicate the past as something bygone and which has died off into an irretrievable 
oblivion. Macquarrie and Robinson translate Gewesenheit as “having-been,” which is 
demonstrative of Heidegger’s attempt to retrieve an understanding of temporality as both 
necessary for an existential investigation into Dasein as well as ontologically constitutive of 
Dasein. To draw parallels to Dasein’s essential futurity, Heidegger writes that “only in so far as 
Dasein is as an ‘I-am-as-having-been,’ can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such a way 
that it comes back. As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as ‘having been’” (BT 373). 
Thus, ecstatic temporality does not only run ahead but is grounded in and goes towards Dasein’s 
Gewesenheit as well, even if “the character of ‘having been’ arises, in a certain way, from the 
future” (ibid.). Heidegger’s privileging of futurity within Being and Time does not cancel out the 
importance of the past but instead recovers the past as a necessary element of temporalization 
constitutive of an understanding of Being—something which is not possible within the ordinary 
conception of time.  
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Again, Heidegger does not conceive ecstatic temporality as awaiting moments to come or 
merely to acknowledge of past moments. Dasein’s resolute anticipation “discloses the current 
Situation of the ‘there’ in such a way that existence, in taking action, is circumspectively 
concerned with what is factically ready-to-hand environmentally” (ibid.) by incorporating the 
structures of the future and Gewesenheit into an understanding of Being that guides all 
meaningful action in the world. Heidegger only hints at the role of the present in Being and 
Time, and uses the German Gegenwärtigen. Macquarrie and Robinson translate this word as 
“making-present” in Being and Time; Hofstadter translates it as “enpresenting” in Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology. Heidegger writes of Gegenwärtigen in Being and Time that   
resolute Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand in the Situation—that is to say, 
taking action in such a way as to let one encounter what has presence 
environmentally—is possible only by making such an entity present. Only as the 
Present in the sense of making present, can resoluteness be what it is: namely, 
letting itself be encountered undisguisedly by that which seizes upon it in taking 
action. (BT 374) 
And he will later expand his definition of Gegenwärtigen in Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
to specifically include a relationship of the present to the now: “whenever I say "now" I am 
comporting myself toward something extant or, more precisely, toward something present which 
is in my present. This comportment toward something present, this having-there of something 
present, a having which expresses itself in the now, we call the Gegenwärtigen [enpresenting] of 
something” (BPP 259). What is necessary to note, however, is that Heidegger is careful not to 
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collapse the ecstases of the future and past into the present. Although he resuscitates Dasein’s 
relationship to the present and the now in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, he does not 
venture from Being and Time’s central thesis that the authentic now has nothing to do with the 
Aristotelian moment, but instead is best expressed in terms of the “moment of vision,” or the 
Augenblick. Even before discussing the Augenblick, however, Heidegger writes that “making-
present, as the primary basis for falling into the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand with which 
we concern ourselves, remains included in the future and in having been, and is included in these 
in the mode of primordial temporality” (BT 376). As the ground for the structure of care, 
primordial temporality necessarily involves the three ecstases of time, even if Dasein’s 
engagement with the world is primarily inauthentic and does not fully recognize or affirm the 
three ecstases of time, reducing these ecstases to the timing of passing nows. However, as 
authentic and “when resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so 
precisely in order to be more authentically ‘there’ (‘da’) in the ‘moment of vision’ as regards the 
Situation which has been disclosed” (ibid.).  
As such, we have returned full circle back to a greater understanding of Dasein’s Da, 
which is given through the three ecstases of primordial temporality. Such temporality is “the 
primordial unity of the structure of care” (BT 374) and is what underlies the previously 
topological characteristics of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. As Heidegger explains, “the future, 
the character of having been, and the Present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the 
‘towards-oneself’, the ‘back-to’, and the ‘letting-oneself-be-encountered-by’” (BT 377). Each 
one of these temporal characteristics grounds characteristics of the structures of care and being-
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in-the-world: in the present, Dasein is in the mode of ‘letting-oneself-be-encountered-by’ which 
translates into being alongside (BT 89). As futural, Dasein is in the mode of “towards-oneself” 
which translates into the “for-the-sake-of-which” (BT 119), and as historical, Dasein is in the 
mode of ‘back-to’ which translates into Dasein’s facticity, thrownness, and the character of the 
always already (immer schon) (BT 82). Chernyakov summarizes the ontological importance of 
tying together the fundamental characteristics of care and being-in-the-world to original 
temporality:  
[T]he ontological meaning of care is the primordial temporality that is nothing 
else but a triad of ecstases of time, every one of which is unthinkable by itself and 
constitutes just an aspect of a tripartite unity. Care as the “root” of the being of 
Dasein means, in temporal interpretation, ecstasis before stasis, the primordial 
opening of the topos of Da, in which time temporalizes itself in the primordial 
way. In the tripartite unity of time lies the foundation of the unifying unity of the 
existentiale of care. (OT 194) 
The topos of Dasein’s Da, its Spielraum, is made possible through an opening that is itself 
opened by ecstatic temporality. Again here I argue it is important to continue with the language 
of play, since that is exactly what is opened up through ecstatic temporality. As Chernyakov has 
shown, temporality itself is constantly at play as ecstasis: there is no singular point in which 
temporality arises out of and then begins to go outside of itself. Such an ecstasis guarantees the 
free play of possibilities of Being for Dasein, which are crucial for the early Heidegger’s 
ontological investigations.  
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IV. David Krell’s Elucidation of Heidegger’s Four Theses 
Now that I have laid out some of the foundational considerations of Sorge and made a 
case for its ontological novelty, I turn now to David Farrell Krell in order to transition into an 
explication of the theory of ecstatic temporality as it appears in §65 of Being and Time. In his 
works Intimations of Mortality and Ecstasy, Catastrophe, Krell outlines the four theses that 
comprise Heidegger’s theory of temporality. To my knowledge, Krell is the only writer to break 
the theory into its four supporting legs, which I believe to be exhaustive of the theory of ecstatic 
temporality as it is expressed in 1927, the year of Being and Time’s publication. Krell’s 
organization of these theses allows for a clear line of argumentation to follow within Heidegger’s 
account of ecstatic temporality within Being and Time and will allow me to break down the 
theory into its constituent parts for a comprehensive discussion of each thesis. I will discuss all 
four of them in depth and in order, beginning with thesis one below. We’ve already set the 
groundwork for such a thesis above (given that thesis one is a grounding of the phenomenal 
characteristics of Sorge in temporality), but I believe the first aspect of this thesis, the so-called 
“temporalization of temporality,” needs to be expanded further out from the treatment above, as 
it cannot be explained simply in terms of Sorge.  
Heidegger’s first indication of time’s self-temporalization appears on page 377 of Being 
and Time: “Temporality ‘is’ not an entity at all. It is not, but it temporalizes itself. Nevertheless, 
we cannot avoid saying, ‘Temporality “is” … the meaning of care’, … the reason for this can be 
made intelligible only when we have clarified the idea of Being and that of the ‘is’ in general. 
Temporality temporalizes, and indeed it temporalizes possible ways of itself” (BT 377). What is 
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thus at stake here is an ontological claim about the being of time. Contrary to the Aristotelian 
model, where the now has (some) ontological claim to being, Heidegger is completely 
abandoning all attempts to understand temporality within the schema of the present-at-hand1, 
Vorhandenheit: “Temporality ‘is’ not an entity at all.” As I indicated above, Heidegger is arguing 
for an understanding of temporality that has absolutely no basis of understanding in the schema 
of Vorhandenheit in that the characteristics of the ecstases of temporality are never structured 
against the "now" whose ontological grounding is that of the presence of the present. Instead, the 
phenomenal characteristics of ecstatic temporality are the ‘towards-oneself’, the ‘back-to, and 
the ‘letting-oneself-be-encountered-by’.2 None of these phenomenal characteristics are grounded 
in the present moment, the “now.”  Here is Krell’s first thesis he finds in Heidegger’s analysis: 
 
● Thesis one: “Time is originally the temporalization of temporality [die 
Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit] which makes possible the constitution of the structure 
of care” (EC, 21)3. 
Krell’s own notes on the thesis are scant as he devotes only about half of a page to it. 
Heidegger too devotes but one paragraph to his description of temporality’s self-temporalization 
in §65. But we can begin to unpack the meaning of self-temporalization through Krell’s hint: 
																																																						
1	The “schema of Vorhandenheit” will be used as the shorthand for an understanding of Being that is derived out of 
an understanding of beings that are not Dasein, beings which are present-at-hand, and the ontology that grows out of 
such an understanding. 
2 Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart zeigen die phänomenalen Charaktere des “Auf-sich-zu”, des “Zurück auf”, des 
“Begegnenlassens von” (SZ 329). 
3 All four theses appear in numbered order on page 21 of Ecstasy, Catastrophe so I will omit citation for the 
remaining three. 
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“temporality is not; it ensues” (EC 21). That time is too elusive to be called a being was known 
to Aristotle, but what here is being meant by saying that temporality ensues? Heidegger answers 
that “temporality temporalizes, and indeed it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These make 
possible the multiplicity of Dasein’s modes of Being, and especially the basic possibility of 
authentic or inauthentic existence” (BT 377). If the ensuing temporalization of temporality is 
bound up directly with authenticity/inauthenticity and care, then what ensues is the making-
possible of not only the phenomenal characteristics listed above, but the space for meaning and 
action at all. The self-temporalization of temporality means that Dasein is ontologically freed 
towards its possibilities-of-Being and “clears the ‘there’ primordially. It is what primarily 
regulates the possible unity of all Dasein’s existential structures” (BT 403). In a double 
movement, ecstatic temporality both clears the way of Dasein’s Da and guarantees the very 
possibility for meaning and an understanding of Being, as expressed through the phenomenal 
characteristics listed above. “We understand the light of this clearedness only if we are not 
seeking some power implanted in us and present-and-hand, but are interrogating the whole 
constitution of Dasein’s Being—namely, care—and are interrogating it as to the unitary basis for 
its existential possibility” (ibid.). And, as we have just seen, interrogating care means 
interrogating temporalization.  
 
● Thesis two: “Temporality is essentially ecstatic.” 
 
I’ve alluded to this in broad strokes above but Heidegger’s claim in §65 about the ecstatic 
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nature of time is an ontological claim about the ‘essence’ of temporality. Thesis one and thesis 
two are somewhat related to each other, if not for the fact that they are separated in §65 by one 
paragraph break. Nonetheless, we must examine the claim as it appears in this section.   
The phenomena of the ‘towards…’, the ‘to…’, and the ‘alongside…’ [zu… auf… 
bei…], make temporality manifest as the ἐκστατικόν pure and simple. Temporality 
is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself. We therefore call the 
phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the 
‘ecstases’ of temporality. Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first 
emerges from itself; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the 
ecstases. (BT 377)  
This selection employs somewhat traditional metaphysical language in its description by using 
words such as “unity” and “essence” and thereby runs the risk of leading the reader astray into 
the typical metaphysical categories that employ such terms, and more specifically the category of 
substance or ousia. However, Heidegger later asks us in Basic Problems to avoid such an 
interpretation: “The common Greek expression ἐκστατικόν means stepping-outside-self. It is 
affiliated with the term ‘existence.’ It is with this ecstatic character that we interpret existence, 
which, viewed ontologically, is the original unity of being-outside-self that comes-toward-self, 
comes-back-to-self, and makes-present” (BPP 267, translation amended). By underscoring the 
affiliation between existence and ecstasy, Heidegger is attempting to undercut the traditional 
category of substance in his ontology of temporality. He goes on to explain that “within itself, 
original time is outside itself; that is the nature of its temporalizing. It is the outside-itself itself. 
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That is to say, it is not something that might first be an extant thing and thereafter outside itself, 
so that it would be leaving itself behind itself. Instead, within its own self, intrinsically, it is 
nothing but the outside-itself pure and simple” (ibid.). Essentially, Heidegger’s ontology of time 
is such that there is not and cannot be any moment of the “now” that has the metaphysical status 
of being a substance which undergirds the past and the future—such a “now” only belongs to the 
ordinary concept of time.  As the ekstatikon, temporality has no such “now,” but functions in 
such a way that each ecstasis of time is constantly flowing outwards and returning back again 
without ever coming back to any sort of essence or underlying metaphysical temporal building 
block such as the “now.” As Heidegger puts it, “The unity of the three dimensions [ecstases] 
cannot derive from one particular dimension—for example, the present” (IM 53).  
Perhaps we can imagine how this works in an example given the structure of care: when I 
prepare myself to make a decision, I am projecting myself out into the future and returning back 
to myself as well as drawing on my history and situatedness and likewise returning to the 
decision in a constantly flowing way that does not, contrary to the vulgar understanding of time, 
refers me back to a “present moment” but instead involves me in an ecstatic experience of 
temporality that involves the future, past (or having-been), and present simultaneously without 
ever fixing itself to a single given moment.4 Michael Watts writes of ecstatic temporality that 
“the moments of Dasein’s authentic temporality stand outside themselves, linked to each other 
by countless pathways of memory and anticipation that reach into both past and future” (PH 
122).  
																																																						
4 Of course, authenticity is dependent on the Augenblick which synthesizes all three ecstases of temporality but 
which nevertheless cannot be reduced to a simple “now” of time, since the Augenblick has no fixed given duration.  
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Belonging to the phenomenality of ecstatic temporality is the word Entrückung, which is 
translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as both “rapture” and “carry away.” Heidegger first uses 
this term in §68, immediately following an introductory mention of the Augenblick:   
This term [Augenblick] must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasis. It means the 
resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and 
circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern, but a 
rapture [Entrückung] which is held in resoluteness (BT 387).5  
Heidegger renders ecstasis directly as Entrückung one page later when discussing the structure of 
forgetting (Vergessen), in which forgetting, as ‘backing-away,’ “closes off ecstatically that in the 
face of which one is backing away, and thereby closes itself off, too” (BT 379). By 
usingEntrückung to describe ecstatic temporality, Heidegger is drawing a relationship not only to 
“the motion of time itself but to the connection between temporality and the possibilities that 
Dasein encounters in the world” (EC 30). However, as Kockelmans notes, “ek-stases are not 
simple ‘raptures’ in which one gets carried away; rather, there belongs to each ek-stasis a kind of 
‘wither’ to which one is carried away” (“HTB” 148). If the Entrückungen discussed in these 
sections are not just the forces that sweep Dasein away, then what are they? Krell answers that 
“at all events, enrapturement has to do with a very particular ‘situation,’ namely, the proper or 
authentic possibility of Dasein as being toward death” (EC 30). (I will speak on the issue of 
futurity in ecstatic temporality later on, while covering Krell’s fourth thesis.) In this account, we 
																																																						
5 “Dieser Terminus muß im aktiven Sinne als Ekstase verstanden werden. Er meint die entschlossene, aber in der 
Entschlossenheit gehaltene Entrückung des Daseins an das, was in der Situation an besorgbaren Möglichkeiten, 
Umständen begegnet” (SZ 338). 
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can tie the poles to which Dasein is entrückt (and thereby stretched between) to both Being-
towards-death in the future as well as an authentic relationship to Gewesenheit, which is 
exemplified in Being and Time as repetition (Wiederholung) (see SZ 343). As discussed earlier in 
the examination of the temporal structure/meaning of care, the background of Dasein’s inner-
worldly dealings is a futural projection into potential possibilities, besorgbaren Möglichkeiten; 
temporality as the ekstatikon is what allows for such a projection to be possible in the first place 
as a carrying away.  
 Such a carrying away, however, presupposes an opening to which Dasein could be 
carried away into. Heidegger writes that “every Entrückung is in itself open” (BT 430). And if 
temporality is primordially an ekstatikon , which means the “original outside-itself,” what is the 
“outside” and what is temporality opened to?  
 
● Thesis three: “Temporality temporalizes originally out of the future.”  
 
Again, let us begin here with the origin of this thesis in its most distilled form: 
“Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic future and in 
such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present” (BT 378). Although 
Heidegger does not argue for an understanding of temporality that resembles a “cumulative 
sequence” that originates temporally into future then cascades into the present and past—in fact, 
he argues the opposite: each ecstasis is equiprimordial (gleichursprünglich), but he does say that 
“within this equiprimordiality, the modes of temporalizing are different” (ibid.) and that 
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primordial temporalization can indeed be determined by the futural ecstasis. In Krell’s words, the 
ecstasis of the future has non-temporal (in the sequential sense) “apriority” (EC 25). Let us also 
link this passage to an earlier statement: “Self-projection upon the ‘for-the-sake-of-oneself’ is 
grounded in the future and is an essential characteristic of existentiality. The primary meaning of 
existentiality is the future” (BT 375-76). Additionally, Heidegger had written about the 
primordiality of the futural ecstasis as early as 1924 in the short work “The Concept of Time”: 
“With regard to time, this means that the fundamental phenomenon of time is the future” (CT 
14E).  
Firstly, Heidegger makes an important move in the first passage, which is to declare that 
authentic temporality is futural, and is futural to the extent that the present is “awakened” as 
what is actually and primordially not the present as such but is instead the Gewesenheit of the 
future. It should not be in doubt that Heidegger’s primary target here in redefining the present as 
the history of a future is the philosophical tradition, which has viewed the meaning of time as 
what happens in the present. I have discussed above the importance of this in terms of care, 
Dasein’s Seinsverstandnis is based off of a projection of itself into the future, which is ultimately 
bracketed by an authentic relationship towards its own death through the production of “the 
horizon of possibility in general, within which a definite possible can be experienced” (OT 199). 
The Entrückung of Being-towards-death as futural would thus place Dasein, as coming back to 
itself, as the living Gewesenheit. Regarding Dasein’s lived status as gewesen, Heidegger writes 
that “‘as long as’ Dasein factically exists, it is never past [vergangen], but it is indeed as already 
having been, in the sense of the ‘I am-as-having-been’. And only as long as Dasein is, can it be 
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as having been” (BT 376). This particular conversation concerns Dasein’s temporality in the 
ecstasis of having been (gewesene Ekstase), but immediately follows the assertion that the 
primary meaning of existentiality is the future and is used to support Heidegger’s claim that what 
we think of the “present” is really just the past of the future. With that in mind, how do we cross 
the threshold from the structure of understanding to making claims about the ontology of 
temporality? Does the fact that understanding is produced through the futural ecstasis necessarily 
mean that time itself temporalizes from out of the future? The answer lies in something of a 
tautology, wherein “as the identity of the very term implies, the futural essence of existence is 
defined by futural existentiality” (IM 55). Such a tautology ties Dasein to the topographical 
clearing that I have elucidated above, as well as the nullity of death (discussed in Section I), 
against which Dasein is pushed up against in the experience of anxiety as discussed in §69.6 So 
far, Heidegger’s reliance on the apriority of the future allows Being and Time to underscore the 
fundamentally temporal nature of Dasein’s Spielraum, which frees understanding, meaning, and 
transcendence (Heidegger grounds the possibility of transcending into a world at all on ecstatic 
temporality, see §69 of Being and Time) out of their imprisonment in the present and roots them 
in all three ecstases of primordial temporality. But does that make Heidegger’s justification for 
the third thesis, that temporality temporalizes primordially out of the future, merely post hoc? Is 
it possible to maintain the above aspects of Dasein’s Being without claiming the third thesis? 
																																																						
6 Regarding anxiety, Luchte writes that “anxiety is not anxious about any being ‘in’ the ‘world’, any involvement, 
but instead, discloses this world as a topos of sheer possibility, as a complex projection of ecstatic temporality. In 
falling, one flees from itself as this possibility, hiding in the generic so as to avoid the intimacy of self-
interpretation” (HEP 153). Heidegger is clear about the relationship of anxiety and temporality, and such a relation 
is crucial to the clearing of Dasein’s topos of understanding and possibility. 
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Being and Time is unclear, and later works seem to dodge the question altogether. 
The third thesis appears from “The Concept of Time” in 1924 to Being and Time in 1927, 
but is either severely walked back or abandoned altogether by the time of Basic Problems in 
1929. In Basic Problems, Heidegger spends virtually no time arguing for the thesis that 
temporality temporalizes originally out of the future. Rather, discussions of the futural ecstasis 
appear in the context of Sorge, which shows up consistently throughout the early Heidegger’s 
discussions of temporality and understanding.7 Rather, Basic Problems should be viewed as an 
attempt to resuscitate or salvage the eckstasis of the present, and Heidegger spends the lion’s 
share of §§19-21 of Basic Problems giving an account of Gegenwärtigen (making-present) and 
Praesenz (the horizon of the present), the ecstatic schema of the present. This is problematic for 
reasons that we shall see in the fourth thesis. 
 
● Thesis four: “Original time is finite.” 
 
Thesis four appears near the end of §65. Heidegger writes that Dasein “does not have an 
end at which it just stops, but it exists finitely. The authentic future is temporalized primarily by 
that temporality which makes up the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness; it thus reveals itself as 
finite” (BT 378).  
Thesis four is the most bewildering thesis if viewed from the lens of “ordinary” 
																																																						
7 He writes in 1924 that the “first principle of all hermeneutics” is “the possibility of access to history [that] is 
grounded in the possibility according to which any specific present understands how to be futural” (EC 20E). See 
above for the quote at BT 375-76 regarding the future as the primary meaning of existentiality.  
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considerations of temporality. Although I believe Heidegger is successful in arguing for the 
ecstatic nature of understanding and against the absolute primacy of the present now, the fourth 
thesis strikes directly at the heart of what has become a virtual tautology: eternity. Time’s 
relation to eternity seems to have been a foregone conclusion since at least Plato, who wrote in 
Timaeus that time is the moving image of eternity; Aristotle’s reliance on the very principle of 
eternity in regards to the prime mover is a central principle of his metaphysics. However, as 
Heidegger keenly points out in 1924, that 
if God were eternity, then the way of contemplating time initially suggested 
would necessarily remain in a state of perplexity so long as it knows nothing of 
God, and fails to understand the inquiry concerning him. If our access to God is 
faith and if involving oneself with eternity is nothing other than this faith, then 
philosophy will never have eternity and, accordingly, we will never be able to 
employ eternity methodologically as a possible respect in which to discuss time. 
(CT 1E) 
Due to theological reasons, we find the meaning of time in eternity. But if God is unknowable— 
no doubt due to God’s eternality—how is time and its eternality supposed to be known?8 
Aristotle’s discussion of time in Book ∆ of Physics perhaps gets philosophy into the door of 
discussing time, but Aristotle’s endless stream of ‘nows’ “fabricates, via its linear mathēsis, an 
illusion of everlastingness, although in truth, it is finite, and soon breaks down” (HEP 22), 
																																																						
8 Heidegger is no doubt influenced by Kant’s discussion of the first antinomy in the first Critique. Although 
discussing this influence is outside of the scope of this paper, see Sherover’s Heidegger, Kant and Time for coverage 
of this topic. 
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Luchte writes, summarizing Heidegger’s implicit criticism in this section. “Any "now" becomes 
the being of time, that sequence with a transitionary character of a ‘not yet’ and ‘no longer’. A 
"now" is slippery, always points beyond itself—it promises an ‘everlastingness’, but this bad 
infinity of a ‘clipped sequence of nows’ covers over our true ‘eternity’” (HEP 20). The two-
dimensional line of discrete “nows,” common to both Aristotle as well as Edmund Husserl, 
carries the prospect of the future only as a promise through an understanding of the now as the 
porous barrier between the past and future, time’s two “modes” of non-being. For Heidegger, 
drawing from Hegel’s concept of “bad infinity,” we cannot merely draw eternity together by 
pasting a theoretically endless number of “nows” together. Such an understanding of eternity is 
based on a purely mathematical model, but has absolutely no relation to finitude. 
 Heidegger does not deny that time will proceed “in spite of my own no-longer-Dasein” 
(BT 378) and that there is a potentially unlimited number of things that can still happen in the 
future. Heidegger objects that these reservations do not prove that time is infinite. Rather, these 
seem to be characteristics of das Man, the “they” of average everydayness, who is always 
exceeding and outstripping ‘my’ time and will certainly continue out of my death: “in the infinite 
"now" Dasein lives as the They-self [das Man]” (DPT 134). Rather, Heidegger writes that 
primordial temporality’s finitude  
is not about everything that still can happen ‘in a time that goes on’, or about what kind 
of letting-come-towards-oneself we can encounter ‘out of this time’, but about how 
‘coming-towards-oneself’ is as such, to be primordially defined. Its finitude does not 
amount primarily to a stopping, but is a characteristic of temporalization itself. (ibid.) 
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Given the structure of the future as the phenomenal characteristic of letting-come-
towards-oneself, Being-towards-death means, then, that Dasein constantly lets its own death—
the possibility of an impossibility, or a nullity—come towards it and indeed exists inside of this 
nullity. Belonging to the structure of death is “that the future closes one’s potentiality-for-Being; 
that is to say, the future itself is closed to one, and as such it makes possible the resolute 
existentiell understanding of nullity” (BT 379). So despite the fact that Heidegger does not deny 
that time will continue on after one’s death, Heidegger is pointing to the fact that the fact that 
time ‘closes off’ is not only characteristic of the future, but of original temporality itself. In other 
words, the future is not just what continues eternally in front of the present. Rather, it belongs to 
ecstatic temporality, specifically the future, to not only open out into the Spielraum of 
possibilities, but to close down on them as well, as we have seen in the ontological analysis of 
death and Being-towards-death.  
 This is why Heidegger argues that the typical relationship of finitude and eternity is 
backwards. In the ordinary or vulgar conception of time, Dasein dies when it, as it were, runs out 
of nows. But the ordinary conception of time also understands that there have been nows that 
preceded Dasein before its death and will succeed it after its death. After all, this is the 
relationship that all things that are not Dasein But, as Heidegger writes in Basic Problems, if 
the nature of time is understood in this way, it follows that time must then be 
conceived as an endless sequence of nows. This endlessness is inferred purely 
deductively from the isolated concept of the now. And also, the inference to the 
endlessness of time, which has a legitimate sense within certain limits, is possible 
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only if the now is taken in the sense of the clipped sequence of nows. It can be 
made clear—as was shown in Being and Time—that the endlessness of common 
time can enter Dasein’s mind only because temporality itself, intrinsically, forgets 
its own essential finitude. Only because temporality in the authentic sense is finite 
is inauthentic time in the sense of common time infinite. (BPP 273) 
Not only does Dasein forget its own finitude, but it forgets the fact that it belongs to the futural 
eckstasis to both open up and close off. The future grounds Sorge and opens up the very 
possibility of understanding, but simultaneously closes down these possibilities through Dasein’s 
finitude, and thus such finitude thus belongs to the futural ecstasis. This double movement of the 
futural ecstasis is precisely what engenders Dasein’s relationship to finitude as such. If Dasein is 
ecstatic temporality, then the fact that Dasein is finite is only given from the fact that ecstatic 
temporality is given as well. Such a relationship to finitude, and finitude as such, is thereby only 
possible by this fact. Heidegger remarked earlier in Being in Time that beings in the world that 
are considered through the Vorhandenheit schema are wordless (weltlos) In Division II, we now 
know that that also means that they do not have the relationship to death and finitude that Dasein 
does. In fact, we cannot even call those things that are Vorhandenheit finite, but merely 
perishable. Heidegger is arguing that so long as we look to things that are not finite, we will only 
understand time based on the “now” and thus only understand the meaning of temporality as 
eternity and not finitude. 
 
V. Reconciling Theses Three and Four 
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As I remarked above while discussing the third thesis, Heidegger distances himself 
almost immediately after the publication of Being and Time from the thesis that ecstatic 
temporality temporalizes originally out of the future by never defending the thesis again, despite 
retaining and continue to defend theses one, two, and four until at least Basic Problems. But if 
Heidegger thought thesis three was indefensible after 1927 (and therefore dropped it in 
subsequent publications), does dropping the third thesis from the theory of ecstatic temporality 
jeopardize his account as a whole? As Krell summarizes, “if the apriority of the future ecstasis 
cannot be maintained, what will conjoin ecstatic temporality and finitude? In other words, what 
is the relation of Time as such to finitude, the negative, and the nothing?” (IM 55). Such a 
problem is complicated within Being and Time itself when Heidegger writes that “in every 
ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole; and this means that in the ecstatical unity 
with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently, is grounded in the totality of the 
structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling—that is, the unity of the care-structure” (BT 
401). Paradoxically, Heidegger then goes on to affirm that “temporality temporalizes itself as a 
future” (ibid). How are we supposed to square temporality’s primordial futurity with 
temporality’s professed ability to temporalize “completely” in every ecstasis? What does it mean 
for an ecstasis to temporalize “completely” if it is the outside-itself? These answers are not given 
in Being and Time, though we learn that there is no single ecstasis off on its own, so to speak, but 
each opens itself onto the other, equiprimordially. 
What is more important here is that, despite the lack of demonstration for them in Being 
and Time, the third and fourth theses do form the outline for a cohesive view of temporality. As I 
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argued above, Dasein, as care, always runs ahead (Vorlaufen) and projects its possibilities into 
the future to come back to themselves. If “understanding is grounded primarily in the future,” 
(ibid.) and Dasein’s existentiality is similarly grounded in futurity via the apriority of the future 
ecstasis, one can see what looks to be a causal relation between the two. Likewise, Dasein’s 
finitude is grounded in the fact that Dasein is constantly existing within a nullity that is given to 
Dasein out of the apriority of the future ecstasis and the fact that this ecstasis closes off the future 
primordially. Again, despite the lack of ontological demonstration present in Being and Time, 
there is a progression among the four theses.  
Perhaps it is because of this lack of argumentation that Heidegger draws away from the 
third thesis, but at what cost does this withdrawal come? Certainly the structure of the argument 
as it appears in Being and Time falls apart. Without the apriority of the future ecstasis, how is 
one to salvage the tenuous-but-existent chain between the third and fourth theses? We must turn 
to Basic Problems for a look at Heidegger’s attempt at a retrieval. 
 I’ve alluded several times to Heidegger’s attempt to resuscitate the present ecstasis in 
Basic Problems, but now the “how” of this resuscitation will figure greatly into looking at how 
Heidegger attempts to keep the fourth thesis without relying on the third. In the explication of the 
horizon of Praesenz, which opens both the Gegenwart and the Augenblick and is therefore 
nonidentifiable with either, Heidegger explains that “the name ‘Praesenz’ itself already indicates 
that we do not mean by it an ecstatic phenomenon as we do with present and future, at any rate 
not the ecstatic phenomenon of temporality with regard to its ecstatic structure” (BPP 306). This 
is a very significant detour away from the ecstatic temporality of Being and Time. Why has 
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Heidegger chosen to render the horizon of Praesenz to be not ecstatic? Krell remarks that there is 
still a question left open after Being and Time, which is to look for the unifier of the three 
temporal ecstases (see BPP 307) and “the question is whether Praesenz can be the unifier” (IM 
58). As the original “outside-itself,” ecstatic temporality is “carried away [entrückt] within itself 
as future, past, and present” (BPP 267). As I have argued above, an Entrückung is not simply a 
carrying-off or an enrapturedness into nothingness; it requires a place to be carried off into. So 
where is temporality itself enraptured, and what part does Praesenz play in this rapture? 
Heidegger answers that “the concept ‘horizon’ in the common sense presupposes exactly what 
we are calling the ecstatic horizon. There would be nothing like a horizon for us if there were not 
ecstatic openness for ... and a schematic determination of that openness, say, in the sense of 
Praesenz” (BPP 308). Praesenz opens temporality up to the horizon of ecstasis as such, as an 
ecstatic being-open-for. In the 1928 lectures on Leibniz’s logic, Heidegger renders Praesenz as a 
question mark in a diagram, remarking that “the question mark signifies the horizon that remains 
open”9 (GA 26: 268, my translation), signifying the inscrutability of this constantly open horizon.  
  However, this resuscitation of Praesenz as the ecstatic horizon still is not without issue. 
The most glaring point here is that Heidegger may have salvaged the spirit of the third thesis at 
the complete expense of the fourth thesis. It is not a satisfying answer to merely leave Praesenz 
as the inscrutable horizon of ecstasis par excellence. Such an answer is problematic in two ways. 
Firstly, have we not just returned back to a kind of theologizing about time? A constantly open 
horizon of ecstasis that has no closure as such sounds like a God-like horizon of time through 
																																																						
9 “Das Fragezeichen bedeutet den offenenbleibenden Horizont.” 
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which all things are possible. Secondly, if the offenenbleibende Horizont of Praesenz remains 
without closure or closing-off, how can Heidegger maintain the fourth thesis? Most 
disconcertingly of all, given its importance, Heidegger comes to a point in Basic Problems where 
he declines to comment any further on temporality’s primordial finitude: “It is not possible to go 
into further detail here on the finitude of time, because it is connected with the difficult problem 
of death, and this is not the place to analyze death in that connection” (BPP 273).  
 Thus, readers are caught in a paradox. One can either develop the four theses as they 
appear in Being and Time with Heidegger’s relatively scant justification, or one can make the 
alterations of Basic Problems and regain an importance of the present ecstasis at the cost of the 
latter two theses. Although Heidegger does insist several times in Basic Problems that 
temporality is primordially finite, such a thesis is greatly jeopardized, for reasons elucidated 
above, if Praesenz is to be understood as the offenenbleibende Horizont, the horizon of ecstasis 
as such which remains open. It appears that Heidegger is aware of this problem, since Heidegger 
is unwilling to justify the finitude of original temporality in Basic Problems. Additionally, if 
Basic Problems puts the theory of ecstatic temporality in limbo due to the falling away of the 
third thesis, he never returns to resolve this issue in his career. Thus, readers are stuck with a 
conundrum: either accept Being and Time’s assertion that temporality temporalizes primordially 
out from the future or reject this assertion, as Basic Problems does, in order to justify Praesenz 
as the temporal horizon which remains constantly open for the other ecstases. If one chooses the 
latter route, one must, at the very least, rewrite the third thesis, and then be faced with the task of 
doing what Heidegger does not (or cannot): justify the finitude of primordial temporality, which 
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seems to require the apriority of the futural ecstasis.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 So far, I’ve attempted to cover all of the major aspects of Heidegger’s theory of ecstatic 
temporality as it appears in the 1920s. I began with a brief discussion of Aristotle’s conception of 
time in the Physics before moving on to Being and Time. My discussion included an overview of 
the structures of Sorge and the grounding of Sorge’s phenomenal characteristics in the three 
ecstases of temporality. This also included a thorough description of what in Heidegger leads to 
David Krell’s elucidations of Heidegger’s four theses on temporality. One of the most important 
discoveries within this section is that Heidegger himself often does not elaborate on his own 
theses, leaving readers with a great deal of legwork to be done in order to make up the lack of 
argumentative justification. This is particularly evident in the third and fourth theses, since 
Heidegger spends only a scant few paragraphs justifying them. It may be the case that the latter 
two theses ultimately fail because Heidegger may ultimately come to believe that they cannot be 
justified, as is hinted at by Heidegger’s complete abdication of the third thesis in the Leibniz 
lecture and Basic Problems, but readers are nonetheless pressed to choose between the apriority 
of the futural ecstasis in Being and Time, which has the structure of both opening-towards and 
closing-off, and the horizon of Praesenz in Basic Problems, which is always open and does not 
close off. While Heidegger continues to insist on the equiprimordiality of all three ecstases (since 
all three temporalize themselves “completely”), the question at hand here is where the primordial 
temporalization of temporality is located. Being and Time affirms that it is located at the futural 
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ecstasis because this ecstasis has the structure of both closing down and opening up. Basic 
Problems affirms that it is the horizon of Praesenz, which constantly holds open temporality, but 
also because it is on this horizon that Dasein makes-present, which is representative of Dasein’s 
authentic totality. However, if Heidegger is to locate the site of the original temporalization of 
temporality in the constantly opened horizon of Praesenz, then the support for the fourth thesis 
(temporality’s primordial finitude) is jeopardized as it is precisely the structure of closing down 
that Heidegger points to as justification of temporality’s finitude. Although moving the locus of 
original temporalization to Praesenz does not, of course, get rid of the futural ecstasis, moving it 
to a permanently held open horizon versus a horizon which has closing down in its structure 
presents a potentially ontologically unsurpassable contradiction between rejecting the third thesis 
and affirming the fourth. And, as I have pointed out, Heidegger himself is unwilling to justify the 
fourth thesis in Basic Problems beyond the mere affirmation of the thesis. I don’t doubt this is 
because he realized that the fourth thesis would need to be revised or properly justified anew if 
the third thesis is to be dropped altogether in favor of Praesenz. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
	
Chapter Two: 
Heidegger’s Destruktion of the Metaphysics of Presence 
I. Introduction 
 The previous chapter was dedicated to an exegetical approach to Heidegger’s theory of 
ecstatic temporality as it appears in the 1920s. I believe that ecstatic temporality is remarkable in 
its own right as a theory of time that is not explicitly rooted in Aristotle’s conception of time 
from Book ∆ of Physics. Historically speaking, ecstatic temporality is a philosophical 
achievement. The current chapter, however, is dedicated to an exploration of the critique of the 
history of philosophy that is inaugurated by Heidegger’s novel conception of temporality. As 
Division II of Being and Time shows, Heidegger’s ontology rests directly upon an understanding 
of Being-in-the-world as fundamentally temporal.10 But the question of what is at the heart of 
Heidegger’s ontology still remains open. In this chapter, I argue that the greatest import of 
Heidegger’s theory of temporality is that it directly combats the philosophical lineage of 
privileging what is presently given to thought in the present moment. My shorthand for this 
philosophical lineage will be the “metaphysics of presence.”11 Although, as I showed in the 
previous chapter, Heidegger moves away from the thesis that temporality temporalizes 
primordially out of the future in favor of an anchoring around the horizon of Praezens, ecstatic 
temporality in Being and Time is not just a resuscitation of the future, but an attempt to break 
																																																						
10 See section one of the previous chapter (“Ontological Topography”) for an explanation of how the ‘prepositional’ 
relations of Being-in-the-world (thrownness, tarrying alongside, ‘for-the-sake-of-which’) are, at heart, grounded in 
the three temporal ecstases. 
11 The metaphysics of presence also includes the modalities of presence--namely, absence. Heidegger does not 
present his ontology within negative theology. 
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free of a metaphysics that can only think in terms of the presence of the present. I looked 
primarily at Dasein’s relation to death in the previous chapter, but expand this reading to include 
Dasein’s relation to natality, the past, and history in the current chapter. This chapter will be 
largely based off of Derrida’s interpretation of the second chapter of the first division of Being 
and Time from his 1964-65 lectures, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History, which I will 
elaborate on later in this chapter. In arguing for Derrida’s interpretation, I will draw upon 
Heidegger’s project of Destruktion and argue that Heidegger’s primary target in such a 
Destruktion is indeed the metaphysics of presence. Likewise, I argue that Being and Time as a 
whole can be viewed as an attempt to move beyond such a philosophical prejudice by first and 
foremost dismantling any theory of temporality that only gives ontological preference to the 
present moment. Finally, I argue that it is only through the ecstatic temporality and the 
Destruktion of the metaphysics of presence is it possible to secure a meaningful ontological 
relationship to finitude, futurity, and historicity. 
 
II. Destruktion and Temporality 
In §6 of Being and Time, entitled “The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology,” 
Heidegger lays out a crucial element of the procedure of his fundamental ontology, which is to 
sweep through the history of philosophy to critically assess how, and on what terms, philosophy 
has addressed the question of the meaning of Being. In laying out the procedure of Destruktion, 
Heidegger takes aim at two fundamental issues directly at the heart of the history of ontology: 
time and what Derrida coins as “the metaphysics of presence.” Through destroying the history of 
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ontology, Heidegger writes that  
we found ourselves faced with the task of Interpreting the basis of the ancient 
ontology in the light of the problematic of Temporality. When this is done, it will 
be manifest that the ancient way of interpreting the Being of entities is oriented 
towards the ‘world’ of ‘Nature’ in the widest sense, and that it is indeed in terms 
of ‘time’ that its understanding of Being is obtained. The outward evidence for 
this (though of course it is merely outward evidence) is the treatment of the 
meaning of Being as παρουσία or οὐσία, which signifies, in ontologico-Temporal 
terms, ‘presence’ (Anwesenheit). Entities are grasped in their Being as ‘presence’; 
this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time—the 
‘Present’ (BT 47). 
An explicit connection here is made between how philosophy thinks time and how philosophy 
thinks ontology, and specifically how this is done in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. 
Heidegger names a few paragraphs later that “Aristotle’s essay on time [in Book ∆ of Physics] is 
the first detailed Interpretation of this phenomenon [of time] which has come down to us. Every 
subsequent account of time, including Bergson’s, has been essentially determined by it” (BT 48-
49). As such, an account of the Aristotelian conception of time will form any basis for an 
understanding of both temporality as well as ontology. It is the importance of this question of the 
link between temporality and ontology that will force Derrida to claim that “everything – 
everything: that is, not only this or that gesture of the destruction of Metaphysics but the totality 
of the destruction and the meaning that directs it as a whole—everything is played out around the 
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meaning of the present and the privilege accorded by the whole of philosophy to the present” 
(QBH 137). 
 
III. Vorhandenheit and Traditional Metaphysics 
  In the selection above, Heidegger hints at the “merely outward evidence” for the 
interpretation of the meaning of Beings in terms of nature or time in the widest sense as the 
treatment of Being as οὐσία or παρουσία (Anwesenheit or presence). This merely outward 
evidence points at the category of such evidence, which Heidegger names Vorhandenheit. 
Heidegger’s analysis of Vorhandenheit in Being and Time is centered around giving an account 
of one of the kinds of beings that we encounter in the world: things that are ready to hand and are 
important to beings such as Dasein because they get implemented into a referential whole in 
such a way that Dasein can meaningfully use such items for various tasks. As we are reminded 
many times in Being and Time, Dasein does not have the kind of being of something present-at-
hand. But this seems to be a rather obvious starting point for the existential analytic of Dasein: is 
it not altogether undoubtable that I am different than the lifeless material objects that I concern 
myself with? While the answer seems to be “yes,” Heidegger is deeply concerned with how 
successful history has navigated this ontological difference, if it has done so at all. What 
Heidegger is working through in his existential analytic is not necessarily to establish a theory of 
equipmentality but instead to see how far this “ontological clue” of Vorhandenheit has 
condemned philosophy to actually be “philosophy as philosophy of the present … [as] 
philosophy pre-determining beings as Vorhandenheit” (QBH 146). The question of determining 
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human existence as separate from πράγµατα is crucial to any ontological analytic, but 
Heidegger’s existential analytic in Being and Time is partly a sustained dialogue with the 
diffusion of Vorhandenheit into the ontological analyses of both being and time. The question 
will be of critical importance throughout Being and Time and will serve as the fundamental clue 
of what Heidegger alluded to above, the interpretation of nature and time in the widest sense. 
 The importance of the concept of Vorhandenheit in both the existential analytic of Dasein 
as well as the task of Destruktion is that the schema Vorhandenheit is uncovered as the most 
primarily given clue for which any type of ontology will build itself up from. This givenness 
(Gegebenheit) of things objectively present cannot be understated, because it is precisely what 
must be overcome if ontology is no longer going to operate within the closure of traditional 
metaphysical ontology which can only think being in terms of the presence of the present. The 
importance of undermining the often unthought privilege of the givenness of things objectively 
present must be underscored: a thinking outside of the metaphysics of presence is so far yet to be 
seen in the history of philosophy precisely because no thinker has yet accomplished thinking 
outside of such givenness. Such attempts to at least separate Dasein from things objectively 
present are frequent and constant in Being and Time. Heidegger will explicitly claim that 
“Dasein is never to be understood ontologically as a case and an instance of a genus of beings 
Vorhandenem” (BT 42). And yet, as obvious as it seems to separate the two, part of the project of 
Destruktion is to expose just how widespread the influence of presence-at-hand is in ontology. 
Of course, the history of philosophy rarely equates Vorhandene with human being, but it is 
precisely from the givenness of things present-to-hand that ontological concepts are formed. In a 
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discussion of the modern debate between subjectivism and objectivism, Heidegger writes that 
Of the essence here is the necessary interplay between subjectivism and 
objectivism. But precisely this reciprocal condition of the one by the other refers 
us back to deeper processes. What is decisive is not that humanity frees itself 
from previous bonds but, rather, that the essence of humanity altogether 
transforms itself in that man becomes the subject. To be sure, this word “subject” 
must be understood as the translation of the Greek hypokeimenon. The word 
names that-which-lies-before, that which, as ground, gathers everything onto 
itself. This metaphysics meaning of the concept of the subject has, in the first 
instance, no special relationship to man, and none at all to the I. (AWP 66-67) 
So long as human being is thought in any form of subjectivity whatsoever, it will always be 
thought in terms of something persisting (in this case, the ground as what gathers everything onto 
itself), something Vorhandenes. Again, what is critical here is that even though modern 
metaphysics (at least since Descartes) opposes the reduction of human being to something 
present-at-hand, the concept by which such an opposition is structured around is contained by an 
ontology of thingliness, of the schema of Vorhandenheit. It is precisely the task of Destruktion to 
investigate just how deeply the schema of Vorhandenheit has penetrated into the history of 
philosophy, at least in the terms of an existential analytic of the kind of being that Heidegger 
calls dasiengemäßig, specifically due to the near-impossibility of overcoming the Gegebenheit of 
things present-at-hand. (After all, where should philosophy begin other than with what it finds 
itself confronted with in the present?) The history of the subjectum may perhaps be 
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representative of the history of philosophy itself (Derrida humorously adds one word in the 
margin in his lecture notes on this topic: “Hume” [QBH 120]), and such a history is precisely 
what is targeted in Heidegger’s Destruktion of that history. For example, Heidegger takes on the 
Husserlian transcendental ego in order to display how rooted philosophy is in the metaphysics of 
presence—even when it attempts to escape such a prejudice. Heidegger writes that Husserl’s 
transcendental ego is understood “as what is always already constantly present (Vorhandene) in a 
closed region” (BT 112), and thus is still a concept of the ‘subject’ contained within the 
metaphysics of presence. Furthermore, it is clear that the phenomenality of intentionality rests 
upon the same metaphysics of presence that undergirds the transcendental ego: a reliance upon 
what is given to consciousness in the present. But the critique contained within Dasein’s 
existential analytic in Being and Time is designed to go much further than particular historical 
iterations of such a subjectum. “Even if one rejects a substantial soul, the thingliness of 
consciousness, and the objectivity of the person, ontologically one still posits something whose 
being retains the meaning of Vorhandenheit, whether explicitly or not” (ibid.). So long as a 
theory of the person is maintained around any kind of objectivity (present to itself, the for-itself, 
the soul, the phenomenality of consciousness, etc.) we will not have overcome a theory that is 
even potentially outside of a metaphysics of presence—rather, it will be another extension of an 
ontology that attempts to link all forms of Being to ousia or parousia (presence), as objectively 
present beings only and exclusively in the present.  
Derrida envisions the Husserlian objection to this aim of Destruktion, which would argue 
that “this identity of the subjectum is not a metaphysical thesis and that, by referring to it, one is 
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merely describing what is given” (QBH 119). Of course, for the Husserlian, returning “to the 
things themselves!” is the clarion call of phenomenology itself: if we are not examining the given 
as given, does not Heidegger run the risk of turning fundamental ontology into a negative 
theology? How is phenomenology to continue methodologically without relying on the structures 
of the conscious experience as they are given? Heidegger himself notes the difficulty of 
overcoming Gegebenheit as the organizing principle of phenomenological inquiry: “But is it not 
contrary to the rules of all sound method to approach a problematic without sticking to what is 
given as evident in the area of our theme? And what is more doubtless than the givenness of the 
‘I’” (BT 151)? Again, the difficulty of starting with what is given is so contradictory that it seems 
to run roughshod against all previous forms of philosophizing. Starting from such Gegebenheit 
has installed itself so firmly into the history of philosophy that Heidegger refers it as one of the 
“rules of all sound method.” How to begin if not starting from what is? 
Heidegger responds to this questioning, to the question of beginning with what should be 
the most fundamental point of inquiry, with a series of questions. 
In this context of an existential analytic of factical Dasein, the question arises 
whether giving the ‘I’ in the way we have mentioned discloses Dasein in its 
everydayness, if it discloses Dasein at all. … What is this kind of ‘giving-itself’ 
on the part of Dasein should lead our existential analytic astray and do so, in a 
manner grounded in the Being of Dasein itself? … Dasein is in each case mine, 
and this is its constitution; but what if this should be the very reason why, 
proximally and for the most part, Dasein is not itself? What if the aforementioned 
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approach, starting with the givenness of the ‘I’ to Dasein itself, and with a rather 
patent self-interpretation of Dasein, should lead the existential analytic, as it were, 
into a pitfall? (BT 151) 
Heidegger’s questions strike to the heart of the procedure of the metaphysics of presence by 
calling into question the very givenness of the given. As Heidegger shows in the “Letter on 
Humanism,” the given (and the metaphysics of presence) is a project of security12, but that does 
that mean that such a project is itself secure. Instead, what is questioned above is whether or not 
the givenness of the given is as secure of a starting point as one might think, or whether or not 
this presupposed security is precisely what leads us, “as it were, into a pitfall.” Heidegger 
specifically argues above that such a going-astray (Verführung) does so “in a manner grounded 
in the Being of Dasein itself.” Which manner is this? Heidegger answers a few sentences later: 
Jemeinigkeit (“Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution” [BT 113]). It is within the 
structure of Jemeinigkeit that Dasein also runs the risk interpreting itself and its experiences 
within the Husserlian framework of the transcendental ego: whenever I reflect on something, it is 
always the I that responds as given. Derrida, however, notes that the “Gegebenheit is perhaps 
here the Verführung itself, that the being-given is perhaps the ruse, the seduction that se-duces, 
that leads off the path, that seduces in the etymological sense: the so-called self-evidence of what 
is given is perhaps here the dissimulation and the evasion itself. An essential evasion that has its 
basis precisely in the being of Dasein” (QBH 119) in that Dasein can both alienate itself as well 
																																																						
12	The German Sicherheit means both security and certainty, which has ontological signification here. Heidegger 
writes that ontology arrests beings as subsisting things that are present-at-hand, both readily available for both 
theoretical scrutiny as well as every kind of mastery and domination. 
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as call on itself within the structure of Jemeinigkeit.  
 Although Heidegger remarks that Dasein’s fallenness (Verfallenheit) makes no claim as 
to whether or not Dasein calls itself as something Vorhandenes, it is clear that such a risk of 
falling into such an interpretation is omnipresent in the history of philosophy. And, as we have 
remarked, it is virtually impossible to overcome—not in small part due to its historical 
rootedness in the philosophical tradition. Heidegger has identified the risk and argued throughout 
Being and Time that daseingemäßig and vorhanden are antonymous, but have we effectively 
established such a distinction within Heidegger’s own philosophy? Such a question cannot be 
answered until progressing to what Derrida sees, in his 1964-65 lectures on Being and Time, as 
Destruktion’s most important task, which is to give a “radical affirmation of an essential link 
between being and history” (QBH 21). However, establishing the difficulty of overcoming the 
schema of Vorhandenheit begins with the existential analytic of Dasein and continues directly 
into the Destruktion of philosophy’s relation to time (and its relationship to Vorhandenheit). Just 
as the history of the subjectum has not freed itself from the schema of Vorhandenheit, the 
philosophy of time has likewise failed to establish itself free from the interpretation of what is 
temporally present, the structure of the “now.” 
 
IV. Critique Contained Within Ecstatic Temporality 
 Heidegger’s continual critique of the subjectum and subjectivity understood within the 
schema of Vorhandenheit is important in its own right, but it is most profoundly connected to the 
question of time. When, in taking aim at the transcendental I, Heidegger writes that “If the ‘I’ is 
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an Essential characteristic of Dasein, then it is one which must be Interpreted existentially” (BT 
152). To this point, Heidegger has already carried out his existential analysis of Dasein’s In-der-
Welt-Sein and argued for the referential whole of things not daseingemäßig, things ready-to-hand 
that are not like Dasein but available for Dasein to use. Heidegger has shown that Dasein is not 
fundamentally removed from the world like one would find it in the transcendental reduction, but 
instead is fully enmeshed within its world and, more importantly, ontologically inseparable from 
it. Although Husserl (like Descartes) began with the givenness of what is seemingly undeniably 
given—the I—it is precisely such givenness that led Husserl away, ironically, from the things 
themselves. However, the work of Being and Time is only half way through here: “This absolute 
independence of subjectivity, says Heidegger, is never given, on the one hand. On the other hand 
it leads, like it or not, to an ahistorical concept of the ego” (QBH 121). Heidegger’s argument is 
that so long as we begin with the givenness of the given, we will always construct a theory of 
subjectivity around the schema of Vorhandenheit, and thus will go astray by describing Dasein 
as what is absolutely not in-der-Welt, and thus then as something that is completely ahistorical. 
Any existential analytic of Dasein must necessarily include a kind of In-der-Welt-Sein that is 
fundamentally grounded upon a theory of temporality that allows for such a relation to the 
ecstases of time. Recall from the previous chapter that Heidegger wrote that “the primordial 
unity of the structure of care lies in temporality” (BT 375). The two branches of Heidegger’s 
existential analytic necessarily suppose each other: “Vorhandenheit pure and simple can no more 
have a history than can a being foreign to the world. Neither the intra-worldly nor the extra-
worldly can have a history” (ibid). And this, of course, is the contradictory model of the 
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Husserlian transcendental ego, which, as Derrida puts it, is “outside the world according to an 
intra-worldly model” which, simply put, “cannot rigorously think transcendental history” (QBH 
122). Such is the Verführung of Vorhandenheit, but once such a leading-astray is addressed can 
the link between being and history be worked out.  
 The crossroads that both Heidegger and Derrida find themselves at in this stage of 
Dasein’s existential analytic is the challenge of yoking together three separate conditions of a 
proper understanding of temporality that will all be linked to an understanding of Being that 
cannot be understood in terms of Vorhandenheit: time itself, history, and finitude (which 
includes both death and birth). I have argued thus far that Heidegger’s Destruktion of 
subjectivity is dependent on an overcoming of the reliance and privilege of the metaphysics of 
presence, which has appeared in the form of philosophy taking the givenness of the given as the 
clue for its starting point. But is it possible to overcome metaphysics and rethink the three 
separate conditions above by way of a renewed thinking of temporality? Derrida lays out the 
explicit stakes of the question at hand: “traditional ontology, then, can be destroyed only by 
repeating and interrogating its relation to the problem of time. In what way has a certain 
determination of time implicitly governed the determination of the meaning of Being in the 
history of philosophy (“OG” 31). To answer such a question, a confrontation with the “vulgar” 
time is required.  
 
V. Hume and Time 
I took note of Derrida’s humorous monosyllabic notation of “Hume” in his lecture notes 
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above. His doing so is clearly because Hume’s theory of personal identity is an attempt to take a 
crucial step past the concepts of subjectivity grounded in the hypokeimenon given to us by the 
Cartesian tradition. However, even Hume’s own revolution in this respect is still trapped within 
the metaphysical problematic that he is trying to usurp. Hume’s “actors on the stage” metaphor 
for subjectivity13 argues directly against any conception of the subject as having a substratum, 
but the fundamental error in such a metaphor is that it is directly constructed upon the vulgar 
conception of time: the actor is lit up and comes to presence only in the “now” and follows a 
linear progression of actors that are before him in the future (‘not yet’) and ones behind him in 
the past (‘having been’). Thus, Hume’s theory falls directly in line with an Aristotelian 
conception of time. Since it cannot break out of this conception, Hume’s theory ends up 
confirming what it sought to overthrow: the hegemony of the subjectum. Although Hume sought 
to work around this by never assigning an ontological lineage to the “actors on the stage,” he 
misses the fact that this theory relies on a temporal subjectum by way of the ever-present “now” 
that illuminates those actors on the stage. In the language of Being and Time, instead of 
describing of describing the flux of personal identity, Hume may well have been on the way to 
simply elucidating the temporal being of something Vorhandenes, which exists entirely and 
wholly in the present “now” with no relation whatsoever to the past or future, which, in Hume’s 
																																																						
13 This sustained metaphor is found in A Treatise on Human Nature (1739) in which Hume argued against the 
continuity or “substance” of human subjectivity that endured through time, instead arguing for a conception of 
subjectivity that resembled a line of actors parading in linear fashion on the stage. In this metaphor, perceptions (the 
“actors”) pass along in the mind (the “stage”) in an infinite number of permutations, never producing a kind of 
identity between them. Hume attempted to show that since the metaphysical notion of human identity is only 
produced through our belief in the identity and supposed endurance of our perceptions and impressions of objects 
over time, the identity of the self could be refuted if it could be shown that the identity of such perceptions were 
erroneous. 
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theory, are ontologically nullified. This is precisely what Heidegger calls in Basic Problems an 
“extant sequence” of nows:  
the time that is known as the now and as a manifold and succession of nows is an extant 
sequence. The nows appear to be intratemporal. They come and go like beings; like 
extant entities they perish, becoming no longer extant. The common experience of beings 
has at its disposal no other horizon for understanding being than that of extantness, being 
at hand. (BPP 269)  
Speaking only from the temporal level, Hume’s theory of personal identity has done little else 
than to confirm an understanding of time which draws its ontology from the being of things 
present-at-hand, namely, as given exclusively within the present “now.”  
Sadler refers to such a constriction in the Aristotelian conception of time, from which 
Hume is not able to escape:  
the ontological priority of the now consists in the fact that bodies, the only ousiologically 
admissible physical realities, can never be found in the past or future, but always in the 
present. In one sense the now is ever different, because it is always at a different point of 
time, but in another sense it is always the same, for it has the ontological function of 
‘presenting’ the real thing itself. (HA 69-70)  
Sadler perfectly summarizes the limitations that Being and Time is attempting to destruct. First, 
Aristotelian temporality reduces or flattens everything to something present-at-hand, or a body in 
motion, which are the only physical entities that the Aristotelian model can account for. 
Secondly, Aristotelian temporality is unable to account for futurity or historicality. As the 
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account of the temporal structure of Being-in-the-world displayed, Dasein is constantly 
projecting itself into the past, present, and future ecstatically: such a projection is not possible in 
the ordinary conception of time because the ordinary conception of time cannot allow for a 
projection into the non-being of the past or future. Thirdly, Hume’s skepticism only repeats the 
Aristotelian ontology of the present: even if the nun is ever-changing, it is still the only locale 
where bodies may present themselves. Finally, it appears that Hume’s analogy mistakes what 
Heidegger calls “clock time” for temporality itself and takes all time to be an “intrinsically free-
floating runoff of a sequence of nows” (HEP 22). 
  
VI. Finitude 
Pointing out the internal failure of Hume’s theory is not enough. What Heidegger is after 
is not simply to throw light on theories of temporality caught within the Aristotelian paradigm, 
but to bring out what their fundamental limitations are. In light of Heidegger’s critique of the 
metaphysics of presence so far, we may also say that Hume’s conception of time leaves finitude 
(and thereby history, birth, death and so forth) unthinkable—even if it attempts to wrest 
subjectivity away from a theory of the substratum. In terms of care, Hume’s use of the vulgar 
conception of time is precisely what makes a relationship to death as such impossible: both 
authentic and inauthentic Being-towards-death “is possible only as something futural ... By the 
term ‘futural,’ we do not here have in view a "now" which has not yet become ‘actual’ and which 
some time will be for the first time” (BT 373).  Such a ‘coming towards’ is rooted not in the fact 
that time cannot be paused or that these moments are coming towards Dasein like the actors on 
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the stage, but instead is rooted in temporal projection. Such a futural projection is not possible 
within the temporality of the eternal now, or the uninterrupted chain of “nows” that proceeds in a 
linear fashion within time. Instead, the relationship towards natality and death is purely formal in 
this conception of time (as “only” the beginning and end of life). But, as Heidegger writes, “only 
that entity which is ‘between’ birth and death presents the whole which we have been seeking” 
(BT 425). So long as one, like Hume, clings to the vulgar conception of time, one cannot even 
formulate the ontological problem of the extension (‘connectedness of life’) between birth and 
death in a way that is not indifferent to that birth and that death. “Dasein is its past and its future, 
is its birth and its death. But the is [est] here designates a Being that can absolutely not have the 
form of presence or phenomenality” (QBH 148). Such an is belongs only to manifestation and 
phenomenality.   
Heidegger writes that the ontological meaning of temporality is grounded in the 
experience of resoluteness as well as authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death. Such is 
Dasein’s futurity. But what about Dasein’s past—its historicity? Very early on, Heidegger writes 
that “Dasein’s Being finds its meaning in temporality. But temporality is also the condition 
which makes historicality possible as a temporal kind of Being which Dasein itself possesses, 
regardless of whether or how Dasein is an entity ‘in time’” (BT 41). Of course, what must be 
subjected to Destruktion first before we can understand such a claim is the ordinary conception 
of time found in Aristotle. Once the Aristotelian model of time has been subjected to critique, it 
is possible to look at historicality as a mode of temporality, “which explains in particular that this 
mode is modified, modalized according to the structures that are those of temporality itself, in 
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particular that the significations of authenticity and inauthenticity will be found again in it” 
(QBH 93). In other words, the question of historicity is a question of how Dasein can relate to 
such a historicity as such, and thus what the temporality of Dasein signifies.  
Contrary to the Humean model, in which the past is merely the oblivion of past actors 
that have departed the stage, Dasein’s historicity is structured by the ontological fact that “in its 
factical Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is ‘what’ it already was” (BT 41).  If this is 
true, it is not possible for Dasein to be historical in any sort of merely formal way (such as 
having some connection to a ‘past now’). Instead,  
Dasein is intrinsically its past: the ist is intrinsically constituted by Vergangenheit, 
without which Da-sein would not be essentially historical. The past does not 
follow, that means that in every Geschenen that ‘historizes’ by projecting into the 
to-come—and there is history only through this exiting of the past, of ek-statis 
toward the to-come—every Geschehen opening the future is already not followed 
but pre-ceded by the past that my being is. (QBH 97) 
Derrida’s insertion of the dash between Da and sein in the first sentence after not using it 
moments before is not insignificant, because what is precisely at stake here in such an 
understanding of historicality is the Da of Dasein, as I argued in the previous chapter. In 
Heidegger’s omnipresent struggle with the separation of Dasein and Vorhandenheit, what must 
be understood is what exactly is meant in the ‘there’ of Dasein’s being-there. (Dasein’s topos, as 
Chernyakov and Luchte write.) Part one of the first division of Being and Time is devoted in part 
to developing the answer in terms of In-der-Welt-sein, and Heidegger grounds this kind of being 
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in ecstatic temporality. Temporality is at the heart of such an understanding of Dasein, so long as 
we do not think that Dasein’s futurity nor history can be understood through something like 
being in time or intratemporal, which only describes beings that are present-at-hand.  
More specifically, what Heidegger has in mind here is explicating the structure of which 
Dasein seems to be constant throughout its existence as movement: “the movement (Bewegtheit) 
of existence … is definable in terms of the way Dasein stretches along. The specific movement 
in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its ‘historizing.’ The 
question of Dasein’s ‘connectedness’ is the ontological problem of Dasein’s historizing” (BT 
427). By engaging with such a movement of historizing, Heidegger’s philosophy of time is 
engaging specifically with finitude. To engage with finitude, one must engage with both the 
heritage upon which one is thrown into (not simply ‘in’) as well as the possibilities of authentic 
resoluteness, which is itself grounded by a futural anticipation towards death. However, contra 
Hegel, there is no falling into history; rather “historicality is rooted in temporality” (BT 428). As 
I alluded to earlier, Dasein’s historicity is modalized by an understanding of the structure of 
ecstatic temporality. Dasein does not fall in and out of history but instead oscillates between the 
structures of authentic and inauthentic historicity which itself is rooted in an authentic 
understanding of temporality itself (which of course itself is partnered with the inauthentic 
understanding of temporality). 
 
VII. Is Destruktion Successful?  
The struggle of Being and Time is in large part to divest philosophy and ontology away 
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from the privileging of the presence of the present. For the reasons that I have argued above, 
Heidegger makes clear that the structure of Vorhandenheit is precisely what we take our 
ontological clues from, and that the history of philosophy has made its moves exclusively within 
the domain of this structure. Additionally, such a trajectory has been confirmed by and has found 
its roots in the Aristotelian conception of time as having the essence of the now that grounds 
Being. But as I noted above, Heidegger himself translates Aristotle’s definition of time in an 
ontological way: “this is time: that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within 
the horizon of the earlier and later” (BT 473). Heidegger’s structure of ecstatic time in the past, 
present, and future is not a counting (because it grounds such counting) but operates within these 
three horizons. Certainly, we have taken some distance from the metaphysics of presence within 
Heidegger’s project of Destruktion. But how much distance is required for an ‘overcoming’ of 
such metaphysics? Heidegger’s anti-teleological conception of history and temporality has its 
ground not in the historical linkage within a succession of time, but instead “in the linking, 
Verkettung, of subject and object” (QBH 207). But such a movement within history that produces 
and is produces in the historicity of In-der-Welt-sein requires “systematically destroying classical 
ontology and … thinking historicity in the open horizon of the question of being” (QBH 211). 
Have we completed such a project?  
Derrida’s answer is no. But we have taken a “decisive step beyond or within 
metaphysics.” Heidegger himself notes that the Destruktion of the history of philosophy and 
inquiry into the meaning of Being is fundamentally enigmatic: “the obscurities are all the harder 
to dispel when we have not disentangled the possible dimensions of the appropriate inquiry, and 
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when everything is haunted by the enigma of Being, and, as has now been made plain, by that of 
motion” (BT 444). These two enigmas likewise plague Aristotle’s Physics. Aristotle himself 
notes that Zeno’s paradox does not clarify anything with regards to the nature of movement, but 
then simply “repeats its aporia without deconstructing it” (“OG” 50).  Such a thought of 
movement outside of the ordinary conception of time is one half of the task of Destruktion in 
Being and Time—yet it remains incomplete. However, the final sections of Being and Time that 
take on such an aporia head-on leave us with some of the most important clues of Heidegger’s 
struggle with fundamental ontology—the “quiet force of the possible” and “auto-transmission” 
(Sichüberliefung)—even if these sections do completely “run out of breath” (HQB 153) . But the 
question of the “overcoming of metaphysics” must be addressed as such for not only an 
understanding of Heidegger’s work, but Derrida’s as well. 
On one of the last pages of Being and Time, Heidegger remarks on the relationship of the 
ordinary concept of time (as a succession of “nows”) to the concept of historicity:  
The ordinary way of characterizing time as an endless, irreversible sequence of 
“nows” which passes away, arises from the temporary of falling Dasein. The 
ordinary representation of time has its natural justification. It belongs to Dasein’s 
average kind of Being, and to that understanding of Being which proximally 
prevails. Thus proximally and for the most part, even history gets understood 
publicly as happening within-time. This interpretation of time loses its exclusive 
and pre-eminent justification only if it claims to convey the ‘true’ conception of 
time and to be able to prescribe the sole possible horizon within which time is to 
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be Interpreted. (BT 478) 
Heidegger here argues that inauthentic historicity is grounded in a certain structure of the history 
of Dasein. So much so seems to be fully in line with the existential analytic that we have been 
working with so far. The last sentence, however, seems to argue that the inauthentic conception 
of historicity is not incorrect, but merely loses its “pre-eminent justification” so long as it claims 
to be the only conception of time. What is Heidegger saying about the inauthentic or ordinary 
interpretation of temporality? The answer to this question lies within the structure of authenticity 
itself. We read earlier in Being and Time that “the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 
'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion 
Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity. … Dasein’s average everydayness, here is not to 
be taken as a mere aspect” (BT 68-69) but instead is grounded in Jemeinigkeit just as 
primordially as authenticity. As I have argued so far, the inauthentic or ordinary concept of time 
finds its origin in the structure of Dasein, as that which takes its ontological clues from what is 
present around it in the present. What does this say about the legitimacy of the metaphysical 
claims that have sprung out of the ordinary concept of time? Derrida answers that “the 
inauthentic understanding of its being does not befall Dasein like an accident; it is a possibility 
and even an essential necessity inscribed in the very heart of its being” (QBH 116). Does that 
preclude the possibility that we cannot merely overturn such understandings in favor of a more 
authentic or primordial understanding of Being or temporality? To this Derrida answers “that 
metaphysics, which is essentially substantialist … is not a fault or a sin of which one should rid 
oneself, of which one could purify oneself by ‘overcoming’ metaphysics. Metaphysics, like 
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inauthenticity, cannot be overcome” (QBH 117). Clearly we have not here overturned 
metaphysics in its entirety—just taken a step beyond or within it—but Derrida is clear here that 
metaphysics is not like a sin of which one should rid oneself. Why does Derrida use such ethical 
language here? What obligation do we have to the history of philosophy, which has potentially 
led us astray so many times in light of the existential analytic? 
To answer this question, we must keep in mind that we must be faithful to the project of 
Destruktion itself. What is, after, all Destruktion? We can be certain that it does means “neither 
annihilation or demolition, nor critique, nor refutation of an error” (QBH 18). Why is this so? 
Simply because Destruktion itself must remain within the constraints of the existential analytic 
that has been set out in Being and Time. We cannot forget that Dasein “is its past, whether 
explicitly or not” (BT 41). After all, has it not been clearly shown that a desire to cast off a past 
would be precisely the kind of understanding of history that would be characterized as 
inauthentic? Any thinking of Destruktion that is a casting off is in and of itself ahistorical. 
“Dasein has grown up both into and in a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it 
understands itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By this understanding, the 
possibilities of its being are disclosed and regulated” (BT 41). Just as Dasein grows up into a 
certain set of contexts and historical situations, so does philosophy. Such a grounding in the 
history of philosophy is also what explicitly grounds the possibilities of philosophy. Dasein’s 
“own past—and this always means the past of its ‘generation’—is not something which follows 
along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it” (ibid.). In other words, the 
possibility of “overcoming metaphysics” takes the double structure of the could not/should not—
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at least in the span of one work. If we were to indulge ourselves in the delusion of a singular 
gesture that usurps the entire canon of philosophy, we would be indulging in a fantasy that has 
no basis in an authentic understanding of historicity itself.  
Such, then, is the importance of the concept of repetition, which Heidegger peppers into 
the last sections of the ontological investigation of ecstatic temporality. He notes in these 
sections that resoluteness grounded in authentic being-towards-death “which comes back to itself 
and hands itself down, then becomes [!] the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come 
down to us” (BT 437). Of course, this is not any kind of deterministic repetition, but a repetition 
that follows the structure that Heidegger calls Sichüberliefung, which Derrida translates as “auto-
transmission” (QBH 184). Such auto-affection is the opening for the possibility (and yes, just 
that) of authenticity itself, which is grounded precisely and explicitly in the auto-affection of 
time that I explored earlier in this essay (“Time is what affects this nucleus, affecting it with 
nothing”).  Heidegger describes the process of Sichüberliefung here: 
“Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free for its 
death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factical “there” by shattering 
itself against death—that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is 
equiprimordially in the process of having-been, can, by handing down to itself  
(sich selbst überliefenernd) the possibility it has inherited, take over its own 
thrownness and be in the moment of vision for ‘its time’. Only authentic 
temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate—
that is to say, authentic historicality (BT 437, all emphases in the original [?]). 
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Derrida describes the process of auto-transmission as “this exiting from the self that rebounds 
onto self and holds itself in the exit from self, gives itself and transmits itself so as to keep it, its 
own ecstatic movement, in itself … taking rigorously into account the fact that the absolute form 
of this movement … is not the present of the now” (ibid.). These passages here require careful 
study, but beautifully capture the kind of authenticity that Heidegger is attempting to ground in 
the authentic understanding of ecstatic temporality as a step beyond (or still yet) within the 
metaphysics of the present—and it is “the only concept that is truly original and proper to a 
thematic of history,” (QBH 206) but is still a concept that is yet to be understood in its entirety. 
Even as such a concept of historicity is grounded in authentic temporality, that also means that 
such an understanding is consistently engaged in a polemic with the inauthentic understanding in 
such a way that they both require each other in order for a true movement of understanding 
within history. But it is precisely within this movement of possibilities of repetition, the more 
that the question of Being is understood not as the presence of the present or as Vorhandenheit, 
the greater chance that “historiography will disclose the quiet force of the possible with greater 
penetration” (BT 446). Such a quiet force of the possible is explicitly the link between Being and 
truth, which is only possible once philosophy asks the question of “the tie between truth and 
presence that must be thought, in a thought that henceforth may no longer need to be either true 
or present” (“OG” 38).  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
I have argued here that Heidegger’s Destruktion of the history of ontology is rooted in a 
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critique of the metaphysics of presence, and that such a metaphysics is rooted in an ontology that 
gets its ontological clues from the schema of Vorhandenheit. If indeed such a schema is to be 
examined critically, any critique must begin with a thorough-going investigation of the concept 
of temporality. Such an investigation highlights that the concepts of temporality begins with 
Aristotle’s conception of time, which places the essence of time as the "now", thereby 
determining what has being as what has presence. Despite recent philosophy’s entanglement 
with the attempt to think of human being in ways not given by this tradition, it is  still inexorably 
caught inside of them. Hume’s theory of subjectivity cuts at the heart of the substratum of the 
individual but is caught within the modern conception of time; Husserlian phenomenality is 
likewise only possible through the presence of the givenness of the intentional object. Likewise, 
I’ve shown that Heidegger’s fundamental struggle in Being and Time is the attempt to distance 
ontology away from a thinking of the presence through a rethinking of Being as temporal, and a 
rethinking of temporality as tripartite (past, present, and future) and ecstatic. Ultimately, I 
believe that the early Heidegger’s attempt to break through some of the fundamental limitations 
of philosophy is successful, so long as what success means is defined clearly. The success of 
Being and Time is not within its ability to destroy philosophy, but to shake it. What does it mean 
to “shake” philosophy? Heidegger is not after refutation, but “to bring out the thinking of being 
that is hiding under the ontic sedimentations” (QBH 18), and what Heidegger “shakes” in his 
solicitation is the “privilege of the Present is the self-evidence, the assurance, the most total and 
most irreducible ground of the totality of metaphysics itself; it is philosophy itself” (QBH 138).   
Although Heidegger does, only a year later in Basic Problems, walk back a number of 
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claims made in Being and Time, Heidegger’s primary success is in proving one of Being and 
Time’s most fundamental claims: that death is unsurpassable. By showing the ontological 
importance of death, Heidegger effectively shook philosophy enough to at least put on display 
that the inability to think beyond the modalities of presence had crippled philosophy’s ability to 
ground the questions of life and death, finitude and natality. Although Heidegger did not return 
to the question of ecstatic temporality after the 1920s until On Time and Being in 1963 (which 
does not resolve, for example, the issue of the reconciliation between the third and fourth thesis), 
ecstatic temporality remains one of Heidegger’s most intriguing and novel projects and remains 
one of the only (if not the only) alternative to an Aristotelian theory of temporality.  
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Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, what I have shown in this thesis is that Heidegger’s project of 
“fundamental ontology” of the 1920s rested on his theory of ecstatic temporality. In chapter one, 
I argued that the structure of care is ontologically ungrounded if it does not rest upon a thinking 
of temporality that breaks out of the confines of a thinking of being as only possible within the 
presence of the present. Rather, Dasein’s engagement with the world has a tripartite temporal 
structure that enables Dasein to be in a world that is given to it as meaningful. And such 
meaningfulness, I argued, is only possible given Dasein’s relationship to the three ecstases of 
temporality: to care is to be temporal. To explore this, I briefly looked at why death is 
“unsurpassable” in Heidegger’s philosophy: by being the boundary that Dasein may not pass 
beyond, death becomes the backstop that Dasein returns to itself against. When Dasein projects 
its understanding out to the future, it brings back with it an understanding that, in the face of 
death, passive indifference is no longer an option. Dasein’s life is its own to shape and mold, and 
this realization is only possible if Dasein understands in an authentic way that it its life will come 
to an end. Ultimately, I argue that for this to be possible, Heidegger is correct in writing that such 
a relationship to death is not possible given the “ordinary” conception of time, in which death is 
merely just some event that will occur in the future. This kind of relationship to death belongs to 
beings that are not Dasein, beings which are merely “in time.” Rather, Dasein’s relationship to 
death means that Dasein cannot be a being that is merely in time, but that “the existential-
ontological constitution of Dasein’s totality is grounded in temporality [Zeitlichkeit]” (BT 488). 
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And, as I showed above, the meaning of this totality is given in care, which is itself grounded on 
the phenomenal characteristics of ecstatic temporality [zu…, auf…, bei…].  
 To explore these phenomenal characteristics, I looked at David Farrell Krell’s four theses 
of ecstatic temporality, which provided a firm foundation to discuss Heidegger’s ontology of 
temporality. The first thesis dealt primarily with the temporalization of temporality and its 
relationship to care, which I have briefly summarized in the paragraph above. The second thesis 
argued that time is originally ecstatic. Such a claim, I argued, is the first explicit attack on the 
ontology of the metaphysics of presence, since it undercuts Aristotle’s fundamental claim that it 
is only the present "now" which enjoys actual being, and that the past and future are 
characterized by non-being. Rather, Heidegger’s temporality states that temporality is the 
original ekstatikon, or that which is constantly stepping outside itself. In order to challenge the 
ontological privilege accorded to the ‘now,’ Heidegger strips the present of its ontological 
priority and argues that each of the ecstases of temporality are equiprimordial and temporalize 
themselves completely. As such, each ecstasis is required for a proper understanding of 
temporality and cannot be collapsed into the other. Next, I looked at the third and fourth theses, 
which are deeply related to one another. In these theses, Heidegger argues that temporality 
temporalizes originally out of the future, and that temporality is finite. In order to justify these 
claims, I circled back to Heidegger’s discussion of death, which pointed to the fact that the 
futural ecstasis has the structure of “closing-down” as well as opening up. Given that finitude 
and death are unsurpassable (both in the sense that they cannot be overcome as well as that they 
make possible the totality of care), Heidegger writes that it temporality originates only out of the 
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futural ecstasis. Consequently, because of this structure of closing-down, temporality itself must 
be finite as well. 
 Branching off of this discussion, I discussed the shift in Heidegger’s thinking in the one 
year between the publication of Being and Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology, noting 
that Heidegger abandons the third thesis of ecstatic temporality in order to account for the 
permanently held open horizon of Praesenz. However, I argue that such a shift jeopardizes the 
fourth thesis since Heidegger no longer looks towards the closing off structure of the futural 
ecstasis, which is potentially reflected in his unwillingness to justify the fourth thesis in Basic 
Problems.  
 After giving an account of the ontology of ecstatic temporality in the first chapter, I 
moved to the second chapter, which sought to give an account for the philosophical importance 
of ecstatic temporality, basing this reading largely off of a Derridean reading found in his 1964-
65 lecture series on Being and Time. First, this chapter entered a new phrase into this paper’s 
lexicon, the “metaphysics of presence,” which refers to how philosophy has constructed ontology 
and metaphysics out of the “ordinary” concept of time (canonized by book ∆ of Aristotle’s 
Physics), which can only think of temporality in terms of the presence (or absence) of what is 
present in the given moment. One must not forget that Aristotle’s intention for the Physics was to 
justify motion. Although Aristotle certainly did not invent the ordinary conception of time, it is 
his account that canonized its justification and ontology. But how could philosophy have built a 
proper ontology out of a temporality that is concerned with little other than bodies in motion? 
Such a question here, of ontology’s development out of temporality, is only possible after 
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Heidegger’s Destruktion in Being and Time. Thus, the second chapter looked at the project of 
Destruktion and its principal target: the schema of Vorhandenheit. I argued that philosophy has 
constructed its ontology by looking at the beings around it and moving out from there. This 
means that philosophy, historically speaking, constructs ontology out of beings that are not 
Dasein, and thus are intemporal [innerzeitig]. Such a building out represents a significant 
blockade to a properly grounded ontolgoy, which Heidegger attempts to work around in the 
1920s through a sustained solicitation of the foundations of the history of philosophy. In this 
chapter, I argued that ecstatic temporality is not only significant because it is a new theory of 
temporality, but because such a theory recognizes that “ordinary” time cannot adequately 
account for Dasein’s being, which is temporally ecstatic. Rather, one of Heidegger’s primary 
goals in Being and Time is to sufficiently ground the phenomena of finitude, which means both 
natality (and thus history) as well as death.  
 In examining such a quesiton, I took one historical example of how philosophy attempt to 
break out of the confines of a thinking of identity and Vorhandenheit by looking at David 
Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature. In my examination, I argued that while Hume recognizes 
that metaphysics has constructed the self out of the impressions given to us by Vorhandene, 
Hume is unable to properly break out of this metaphysics in his critique. In his “actors on the 
stage” metaphor, he merely (perhaps ironically) reiterates the temporality of Vorhandene by 
relying on an ontology of time which gives being only to the present moment. By doing so, 
Hume’s critique collapses back into itself. But the purpose of this section is to show how 
philosophy is unable to break outside of the metaphysics of presence so long as it does not first 
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start out from a renewed thinking of ontology. If it does not do this, it cannot sufficiently critique 
the structure of such metaphysics, and only critiques the individual instantiations of the 
metaphysics of presence. 
 Lastly, I looked at the question of whether or not Heidegger’s project of Destruktion was 
indeed successful. I argue that the answer to this question must be determined by the question 
that is being asked. If the question being asked is whether or not Heidegger completely exited the 
history of philosophy and the metaphysics of presence, then the answer is most definitively “no.” 
It is undoubtable that Heidegger himself would have rejected that possibility, as he wrote several 
times in Being and Time that there is something unsurpassable itself about the metaphysics of 
presence. Philosophy completely bereft of the metaphysics of presence would be ahistorical, and 
thus illegible. Rather, the question I ask is whether or not the project of Destruktion is successful 
in its attempt to shake or solicit the primacy of the metaphysics of presence, and I argue that 
Being and Time is indeed successful in this attempt. At the very least, Heidegger successfully 
argued that finitude is philosophically unsurpassable: one must grapple with finitude if one is 
going to do philosophy. The legacy of post-Heideggerian thinkers who confirmed this is too long 
to list here. But nonetheless, Heidegger’s writings on finitude are based entirely on a rethinking 
of temporality outside of the limits of the vulgar conception of temporality and the privilege of 
the presence of the present that it brings with it. As such, I conclude by saying that Heidegger’s 
greatest success in the early period is in showing that philosophy has been unable to discover the 
connection between ontology and temporality. By focusing on this connection, Heidegger 
changed the trajectory of philosophy in the 1920s by first showing what philosophy was hitherto 
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unable to think and why (namely, the problem of human finitude) and then by grounding an 
attempt towards the meaning of being on an ontology that itself is grounded on ecstatic 
temporality. Ultimately, Being and Time represents the first sustained dialogue with the 
connection between temporality and ontology since Aristotle that does not merely repeat  
Aristotle’s own ontology, something that had not been accomplished in the two millennia since 
the Physics. 
